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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the passage of SAS No. 59 [AICPA, 1988bJ, Asare [1990]
(hereafter, Asare) swnmarized the evolution of research on the going concem
opinion (GCO) in order to evaluate the Auditing Standards Board 's (ASB} as,..
sumptions regarding the signals sent to the market via the GCO. Whlle Asare
provided a thorough review of research on the importance of GCOs and auditors' judgment processes in fonning GCOs, he also suggested that the existi.ng
.¡·esearch findings were not always consistent and suggested several opportunities for future resea.rch that would enhance o~ understanding and unravel sorne
of the conflicti ng findings. Over the past twenty years, researchers have continued to investígate the importance of GCOs. Our objectives are to bring current the evolution of standards, regulations, and literature concerníng GCOs, to
synthesize a body of research that stil.I presents inconsistent findings, and to
suggest future research that could further our understanding GCO fonnation
and consequences.
An updated review of the literature investigating GCO forrnation and consequences is ímportant to future research because these opinions can have farreaching and direct consequences for auditors, their'clients, client shareholders,
and other client stakeholders (e.g., creditors; future imr~stors). Further, many
studies have continued to investigate issues pertainingto GCOs. While Asare's
review incorporated the results of approximately 5Q research papers spanning
about 20 years, we identified over 125 papers conceming GCOs in the 20 years
since Asare's revie w. Given the large volume of research on GCOs, our review
wiU be especially helpful to researchers interested in examining new (or unresol ved) issues within this field of accountingresearch
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We initially identified published academic papers for inclusion in our review of the GCO literatme by searching the ABI Infonn and Business Source
Complete databases using the follo~ing k~ywprds: audit opi!llon, audit r~po1t,
ooinc:> concern, and opinion shop. To inc]ude a more complete body of bteraftue,0we augmented the papers identified frorn the databases with additional
relevant papers ídentifíed via citatíon analysis. Asare reviewed the literatttre
through 1990, so we restricted discussions of specifi.c papers to those published
after 1990. Asare divided his review into the following general sections: (1) the
evolution of auditing standards regarding the GCO; (2) the ability of an auditor
to identify companies experiencing going coocern problems; and (3) the consequences of the GCO. We str ucture our literature review along the same three
broad parameters, and compare the summary results of studies conducted since
1990 to the conclusions reached by Asare wíthin each section.
In lhe second section, we address research relatt::d to changes in regulations
or requirements related to auditors' responsibilities to report going concem
uncertaínties. In the third section, we sunm1arize research rélated to auditors'
identification and forma:tion of GCOs. In the fourth section we discuss the informational value of the GCO, specifícally consequences to client stakeholders
and audit firrns. We ínclude Tables in each section that provide a brief summary of the reviewed studies. 1 We close with conclusions and a summary of
suggestions for future research.

2.0 THE RESPONSIDILITY FOR REPORTING GOlNG CONCERN
UNCERTAINTIES
2.1 Background and Update on GCO Standar·ds and Regulations
Standards and regulations govem auditors' responsibilities for and reporting of GCOs. While auditors' responsibilities concerning·GCO reporting have
remained relatively stable, standards have evolved ovel' time to update the reporting language and to clarify auditors' obligations. Under currenc guidance,
auditors express a GCO when there is "substantial doubt'~ about the client's
ability to remain in business by either modifying the unqualified opinion or
issuing a disclaimer of opinion (AICPA, 1988a; AICPA, 1988b]. A swvey
conducted by Ponemon and Raghunandan [ 1994], found that analysts and
bankers associate "substantial dou bt" with the highest probability of failure,
judges and legislativ.e aides assigned the lowest probability: and auditors fell
belween .the t:-vo groups. The authors conclude that users assign greater weight
than aucbtors mtend. Regardless of which form of opinion auditors select, standaro~ require a :eference to tbe uncertainty surrounding the c!ient's abi1ity to
contmue as a gomg concem in the event of a GCO [AICPA, 1988b].
The AICPA has issued several statements since SAS No. 59 that iníluence
GCOs, most of which clarify or provide additional guidance beyond SAS No.
59. For exampJe, SAS No. 64 clarifi~.d. that the auditor should include the terms
"substantial doubt" and "going concem" when issuing a GCO [AICPA, 1990,
1
•

'When !he resulls of a paper concem more than one scction, we inc!ude the paper in al] relcvaJlt

secuons of thc ICXI and tables.
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paragraph 1]. The AICPA [1995a] amended SAS No. 59 with SAS No. 77, to
preclude the use of conditional language in expressing the GCO. Additionally,
the AICPA [ 1995b] issued AU 9341 to chu·ify that the auditor is under no obligation to reissue an opinion \.vithout the GCO explanatory paragraph if the client later resolves the uncertainties, but if a GCO is reissued as a standard, unrnodified opinion the auditor should perform certain procedures. Fmther, the
ASB is cunently considering revising SAS No. 59 to make the U.S. standard
more consistent with international standards [AICPA, 2010]_2
The passage of several federal laws in the United States, subsequent to
SAS Nos. 58 and 59, also have influenced the regulatory environment surrounding GCOs. In response to the AICPA's and public accounting firms' concems about the profession's "litigation crisis," the U.S. Congress passed the
· , Private Securities Litigation Refonn Act (PSLRA) of 1995 ]U.S.H.R., 1995],
,~hich had a marked impact on public accountíng firms by reducing individual
=áuctitors' liability exposure with respect to litigation involving publicly-traded
Clients to theír specífic responsibílity for the audit [Messier et al., 2010; Geiger
et al., 2006; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2001]. However, the PSLRA covered
oniy suits filed in federal courts, which led plaintiffs to shift venucs from fed~
eral to statc courts [Mcssier et al., 2010]. Subsequent efforts by the AICPA and
the public accounting profession led to passage of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 [U.S. H.R., 1998], which essentially closed this
·potential venue loophole [Messíer et al., 201 O Geiger and Raghunandan,
:i002a].
-In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002
[U.S.H.R., 2002], which led auditors lo believe that the risks associated with
~auditíng public clients increased [Ryu et al., 2009}. In addition to changing the
legal environment of auditing, SOX created the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) and empowered it to promulgate new auditing stan. -dards for public company audits, ending the era of prívate standard setting for
the audit of public cornpanies [U.S.H.R., 2002].
One change the PCAOB has made concerning GCOs is a modlfication to
the second paragraph of SAS No. 59. This change directs auditors to use their
knowledge of subsequent events followíng the financia! statement date but befare the audit opinion date when considering whether to issue a GCO [PCAOB,
2 010, p. 538}. Before this change, SAS No. 59 instructed audítors to consider
subsequent events at the completion of fieldwork [AICPA, 1988b]. Additionally, at the onset of the most recent recession, the PCAOB issued Staff Audit
Practice Alert No. 3 to outline GCO considerations in the economic downturn
[PCAOB, 2008]. In this alert, the PCAOB note d the possibility that the recessien could lead to increased risk of going concern uncertainties, and suggested
auditors consider obtaining additionai information concerning loan defaults,
debt restructuring, denial of credit, and negative trends in operating income,
' Specifically, Lhe AICPA is concentrating their efforts on converging SAS No. 59 wit11 ISA 570 in
terms of (l ) the time period that the auditor muse cover when assessing an cntity's golng conccrn, (2) lcngth
of time beyond the tlnancíal statemenl dlJte that Lhe auditor is re.,p<msible lo assess, and (3) requiring thc
auditor to inquire of management as lo ils knowlcdge of e vents or conditions beyond the period of man agcment's assessment tilat indicate thcrc could be substantial doubt ab<Jut the cntily's abílity lo continue as a
going conc cm.
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cash flows, and financia] ratios. This alert implies that the PCAOB recommends auditors consider going above and beyond the requirements of SAS No.
59 in a recess ion because of increased risk of client failures.
The remainder of this section reviews the researcb that has investigated the
impact of the aforemeotioned standards and regulations. Asare's review did not
identify published papers that investigated the effects of regulatory changes on
auditors' propensity to issue GCOs. However, several studies subsequent to
1990 have examined tbe effects of both standards and regulations on auditors'
propensity to issue GCOs. The key issue in Section 2.2 is whether changes in
standards (SAS Nos. 58 and 59) and regulations (e.g., SOX) influenced auditor
judgments and decisions conceming GCOs. For example, we review papers
that shed 1ight on whether SOX changed auditors' propensity to issue GCOs,
and whether any such change was temporary or represents a more pennanent
change in behavior. Table 1 summarizes these studies.
TABLE 1: The Responsibility for Reporting Going Concern Uncertainties
(Sections 2.1 and 2.2)
Study
(Method)
Ponemon and
Raghunandan
[1994]
(Survey)

Sample
95 bankers,
88 analysts,
32judges,
45 auditors,
and
2 legislative
aides

Dependent
Variable[s]
Perceived
mean.ing of
the terru
"substantial
doubt" in a
GCO

lndependent
Variable[s]
Participant
group

(bankers,
analysts, etc.)

'

-

Griner and
Dugan [1994]
(Archiva!)

3,765
observations
from U.S.
public
companies
from July 1,
J987 through
June 30, 1989

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

WhetherSAS
No. 59 is in
effect

Key
Findinds]
Analysts and
ban.kers
associate
"substanlial
doubt" with the
highest
probability,
while judges
and legislative
aides assigned
the lowest
probabilíty, with
auditors
between the two
groups. The
authors
conclude that
users assign
greater weight
tban auditors
intend.
Non Big N auclit
ftrms were more
likely to issue
GCOs after SAS
58 than befare
the standard

2010

Carcello et al.
[ 1995]
(Archiva!)

Raghunandan
and Rama
[ 1995]
(Archival)

Carcello et aL
[1997]

(Arcllival)
. ..

-

Geiger and
Raghunandan
[200 1J
(A rchiva!)
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446 U.S. public
compantes with
bankruptcyrehtted
opinions from
1972- 1992
362 nonbankrupt
companies are
compared with
175 bankrupt
companies.

Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

Regime (SAS
No. 59, SAS
No. 34, PreSAS No. 34)

Auditors were
more likely to
issue GCOs
following SAS
No. 34 only

Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

Whether SAS
No. 59 is in
effect

248 (440) u.s.
public bankrupt
(distressd, nonbankrupt)
companies
from J9871988 and 19901991

Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

Whether SAS
No. 59 ís in
effect

383 bankrupt
companies
frorn 1991 to
1998

Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

Whether the
PSLRA is in
effect

After SAS No.
59, auditors
were more
Iikely to issue
GCOs for
fin;mcially
stressed nonbankrupt
companies and
for bankrupt
companics prior
lo failurc
Differe nce in
results between
Carcello ct al.
[1995] and
Raghum.1.ndan et
al. [1995] was
an artHact of
how each swdy
managed the
transition period
from the time
the SAS No. 59
was released
and the time at
which the new
standard
became
effective
Audi tors were
less likely to
issue prior
GCOs for
bankrupr
companies after
the passage of
the PSLRA Acl
of1995

Joumal ofAccounting Literalllre

64
Geiger and
Raghunandan
[2002a)
(Archiva!)

Carcello et al.
[2003]
(Archival)

Schaub and
Highfield
[2003J
(Archival)

Citron and
Taftler

[20041
(Archival)

Volume 29

1,871 u.s.
pub líe
companies
under fi nancia!
stress during
1992-1993,
1996-97,and
!999-2000
Al\ (82) GCOs
issued to public
manufacturing
companies
between 19891995 anda
matched
sample of nongoing concern
companies

Whetherthe
auditor issues
aGCO

Whether the
PSLRA and
Securities
Litigation
Uniform
Standards Acl
are in effect

GCOs were less
likely after each
successive
regulatory
change

Whether a
client
dismissed its
auditor
befare the
client's next
annual report

Audit
committee
characteristics

43 firms
issuing 'subject
to' modified
opinions from
l984- L988 and
36 firms
announcing
GCOs from
1989-1996
2 13 going
concern, and
1,456 non
going concern,
U.K public
companies
from 19911996

Average
standardized
abnormal
returns

Wh ether SAS
No. 59 is in
effect

Whether the
auditor issues
a OCO

U.K. standru·ds
changes
similar toSAS
Nos. 58 and 59

Non-standard
going concern
reports were
associated with
longer auditor
tenure, less
client di stress,
companies with
lower
probabilities of
filing for
bankruptcy
The changes
required by SAS
No. 58 and SAS
No. 59 were
cosmetic, and
did not affect
the information
co ntent of those
opinions
The increase in
GCOs in the
U.K. in the
1990s was
attributable to a
changein
auditing
standards that
allowed auditors
to reporl going
concerns as a
modified
unqualified
opinion
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Chen et al.
[20051
(Archival)

4,493
observations
from Chinese
public
companies
from 19952000

Farrugia and
Baldacchino
[2005]
(Archiva!)

419
observations
from Maltese
companies
from 19972000

Whether the
audi!or issues
aOCO

N/A

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

NIA

l.

~~\

1

i

ambiguous
wordíng that is

..

:

;:

Geiger et al.
[2005]
•. (Archiva!)

226 companies
that entered
iuto bankruptcy
Jrom 20002003.
694 U.S. publ ic
companies that
entered
bankruptcy
fro m 199 i2001

¡

Geiger et aL
[2006]
(Archiva!)

Fargher'and
Jiang [2008]
(Archiva!)

1,769

(pre ~

SOX) and
3,344 (postSOX)' ·
Ausiiálian
public ;•

i

¡cómpanies

. :..
.e

.i•;

·,¡ .

~

- · ~::..:·.:

:· .

Chinese
government
regulations
concerning
state-owned
enterpriscs,
corporate
disclosures, and
pub he
accounting
practices appear
to have
stimulated an
.
.
mercase m
OCOs
The majority of
GCOs in Malla
typically use

Whether the
auditor íssues
aGCO

~·

.

Whelher the
auditor íssues
aOCO

Whether Lhe
PSLRA is in
effect

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

Whethcr SOX
is ineffect

' ~··

:

Whether SOX
is in effect

. ·:e·.:~·· .·

'·'" > ··). ··>·.•···.·· '.

insufficient
based on
international
auditing
standm·ds
Auditors were
more likely to
issue GCOs
after December
31, 200 1 (SOX)
Auditors'
propensity to
issue GCOs
decreased
following the
PSLRA,
espécially
among Big'N
auditors
Auditors are
more !ikely to
issue GCOs in
2003 (than presox 19981999), but notin
2004 or 2005

Yolume 29
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Gassen and
Skaife [2009]
(Archival)

Feldmann
and Read
[2010]
(Archiva!)

Matched
sample of
German public
companies
from 19961997 and 19992000: 28 finnycars rec.eiving
modified
opinions and
844 fi rm-years
recei ving e lean
· opinions
565 bankrupt
U.S. public
companies wilh
aud it reports
dated 20002007

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

Whether the
auditor issues
a OCO

Reforms
mandated by
the German
government in
the Act on
Conttoland
Transparency
of Enterprises

Audit fi rms
were more
likely to issue
GCOs following
theGerman
audit reforms of

Whether SOX
is in effect

Auditors are
more likely to
i~sue GCOs
2002-2005 than
2000-2001, but
notas likely to
issue GCOs
2006-2007

1998

2.2 The Effects of Standards and Regulations on GCO Fonnation and Issuance
2.2.1 The Effeéts of SAS Nos. 58 and 59 on GCO Formation and lssuance
SAS No. 59' s issuance generated research investigating the ,effect of SAS
No. 59 on auditors' GCO fonnation and issuance. In particular, much of tbe
research focused on auditor propensity to issoe a GCO, and considered not only
the impact of SAS No. 59, but also compárisons of SAS No. 59's effect with
the effects of earlier standards (SAS Nos. 34 and 58) on GCO frequency and
informati veness.
qrtner and Dugan [1994] examined the effect of SAS No. 59 on U.S. auditors' piopensity to issue GCOs. They found tbat non-Big N audit finns were
more likely to issue GCOs after SAS No. 59 than before the standard, but reported IJO.change in Big N audil finns' propensity to issue GCOs. Ragbunandan and Rama [1995] found that, subsequent to SAS No. 59, auditors were
more likely to issue GCOs prior to the company's failure. Carcello et al. [1995]
compared the e.ffects of both SAS No. 34 [AICPA, 198l] and SAS No. 59 on
Big N auditors~ propensity to issue GCOs. They found a higher frequency of
GCOs following SAS No. 34, but no change in the frequency of GCOs followitig SAS No. 59. Carcello et al. [1997] reconciled the apparently inconsistent
results of Carcello et al. [1995 ] and Raghunandan and Rama [1995] concerning
the jnfluence of SAS No. 59 on auditors' propensity to issue GCOs. Carcello et
al. [1997] found that the difference between the earlier studies was an artifact
of how each study managed the transition períod from the time SAS No. 59
was releascd and the time at which the new standard became effective (April,
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1988-December 30, 1989). Carcello et al. (1997] concluded that the handling of
this transition period is critical to researcn on the effects of SAS No. 59.
Schaub and Highfield [2003] investigated the information content of the
provisions of SAS Nos. 58 and 59 that replaced the "subject-to" modiíication
for GCOs with a modified unqualified opinion. They found that thc opinion
name change had no effect on the informativeness of GCOs. Carce11o et al.
[2003] extended this literamre by investigating differences in the language
auditors selected when issuing GCOs under SAS No. 59. Carcello et al. [2003]
i'ound that auditors use non-standard language, r~ther than boilerplate, in GCOs
associated with longer auditor tenure, less client distress, and companies with
lower probabilities of filing for bankruptcy. Thus, Carcello et al. [2003] suggest
tbat auditors used non-standard language when they believed the client could
.. recover from its going concem difficu!ties.
, In other jurisdictions, Citron and Taffler [2004] examined the effects of
changes in U.K. standards similar to SAS Nos. 58 and 59 on auditors' propensity to issue GCOs. They found an increase in GCOs following the change in
the options for reporting GCOs from the "subject to" opinion to a modífied
unqualified opinion, but no change in GCOs following the standard increasing
auditors' responsibilities conceming going concem assessments. Conceming
audit tinn size, Citron <md Tafi1er [2004] found that Big N audítors were more
likely to use the new repmt format (explanatory paragraph rather than a "subject to" opinion) during the transition phase befare the new report format became mandatory. Farrugia and Baldacchino [2005] examined whether the
.wordi:ng of GCOs complies with international auditing standards. They found
that the majority of GCOs in Malta typically use ambiguous wording tbat is
~~1sutlicient based on international auditing st<mda.rds.
2~2.2

The Effects of Laws and Regulations on GCO Formation and
Issuance

In addition to research on the effects of audiling standards, another body of
literature sheds light on the effects of regulations on auditors' propensity to
issue GCOs. Por example, researchers ha ve found that following the passage of
the PSLRA [Geiger e l al., 2006; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2001] and the Securities Litigation Uniform Stanqards Act [Geiger and Raghunandan, 2002a]
auditors were l.ess likely to issue GCOs, likely because these acts reduced auditors' litígation exposure as discussed ln ~ection 2. 1.
An emerging body of work has begun to investigate the impact of SOX on
the propensity to· issue GCO. Geiger et al. [2005] found that subsequent to
SOX, auditors were more likely to issue GCOs, e ven after controlling for client
characteristics. Feldmann and Read · [201 0] extended this investigation to the
2000-2007 time period and found that auditors were more likely to issue GCOs
to bankrupt companíes in the 2002-2005 lime frame than in 2000-2001. However, this increase in GCOs post-SOX did not persist info the 2006-2007 period
[Fe ldman and Read, 201 0]. Studies done in other jurisdictions provide qualita:.
tively similar results that any increase in auditors ' propensity to issue GCOs
folÍo'wing SOX might be short~lived. For instance, Fargher and Jiang [2008]
found ·that auditors of Australian · companies were more likely to issue GCOs
immediately after SOX in 2003 compared with the pre-SOX period 1998-1999.
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Similar to Feldman and Re.ad [2010], the increase in GCOs in Australia did not
persist long after SOX became effective [Fargher and Jiang, 2008] . This litera.
ture suggests that SOX yielded a temporaty increase in GCOs.
A further srudy in another jurisdiction suggests that German audlt reforms
also intluence auditors' propensity to issue GCOs. The Gerrnan Act on Control
and Transparency of Enterprises instituted several reforms, including changing
the objective of the financia! statement audit from checking compliance with
laws to identífying going concern unce1tainties and inaccurate financia} reporting [Gassen and Skaife, 2009]. Gassen and Skaife [2009] found that German
auditors were more likely to issue GCOs following the reform act than befare
its passage. Sirnilarly, audítors of Chinese firms were more likely Lo issue
GCOs after the Chínese government ímplernented regulations conceming stateowned enterprises, corporate disclosures, and public accounting practices
[Chen et al., 2005].
Whíle these studies have answered certain questions abo1,1t the impact of
SAS Nos. 58 and 59, as well as SOX, on auditors' propensity to issue GCOs,
maoy opporrunities for future research remain concerning standards, regulations, and the formation of GCOs. For exarnple, while much has been learned
from existing studies en SAS Nos. 58 and 59, most research [e.g., Citron and
Taffler, 2004; Carcello et al., 1995; Raghunandan and Rama, 1995; Griner and
Dugan, 1994] investigated short-term consequences of these standards. Future
research could investigate whether the long-term effects of SAS Nos. 58 and 59
on audit quality are similar to these short-term consequences.
Another possibility for future research stems from a recent PCAOB concept release that would potentially require partners to sigo the audit opinion
[PCAOB, 2009]. Because other couatries such as Australia, ltaly, and Taiwan
have similar requirements, research on this issue could provide evidence of
how similar regulatory requirements intluence GCO formation rn different jur.isdictions. For instance, would a partner be more conservative in GCO judgments if he/she is rcquired to persona Uy sign the audit opinion.
Another. research opportunity could stem from the governrnent's response
to the re~,;ent financia! collapse yields opportunities for future research. Por
example, how do government actions such as bailouts int1uence goíng concern
judgments and decisions?
~.OAUDITORS'

IDENTIFICATION AND FORMATION OF GCOS

Om objective in this section is to review the literature that ínvestigates factors that influence auditors' decisions concerning wbether to issue a GCO
¡:gther than rhe standard, unqual.ified opirúon. Client characteristics (section 3.1)
indude s[ze, con){)rate governance, camings management, and press coverage.
,W e also revi~w issu~s concerning the forecasti ng of GCOs and bankruptcies
(3.2) and audttor attnbutes (3.3) such as auditor economic incentives, auditor
~ognitive processes, and auditor expertise. Thc issue in section 3.0 that receives
the greatest amount of debate betweep.· papers. is the conflicting effects of audi~.ors' incentives for profitability and avoiding litigation. While some Jiterature
~\lggests GCOs rcflect prot1tability incentives influence GCbs [e.g., Carey and
Sunnett, 2006], other studies provide evidence that lüigation incentives ínflu-
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ence GCOs [e.g., Tucker el al. , 2003; Reynolds and Francis, 2001]. Table 2
summarizes these srudies.
TABLE 2:

Form~tion

of Audit Opinions (Section 3.0)

Panel A: Cbaracteristics of Clients Receiving GCOs (Section 3. 1)

Study
(Method)

McKeown el
al. [199 1]

(Archiva!)

:

Chen and
Church [1992]
(Archival)

"
~

-

.,.

LaSalle and
Anandarajan
[1996]

(Survey)

Sample
134 U.S.
bankrupt
pubHe
companies and
a control
sample of 160
non-bankrupt
companies
from
1974-1985
127U.S.

public
companies that
received l'irsttime GCOs
from 19821986 anda
matched
sample of 127
non going
concern
companies
208 U.S. audit
partners from
various types
of public
accounting
finns

Dependent
Variable[s}
Whether
the auditor
issues a
GCO

Independent
Vnriablc[s]
Clienl size

Whether the
auditor
issues a
GCO

Default status

Auditors tended
to issue GCOs
co clients in
defaull of debt
covenants;
howcver, default
was not a good
indicator
bankruptcy

NIA

NIA

The client's
negative
attributes were
more importanr
than its positive
attributes when
considering
issuing a GCO;
auditor litigation
risk provides
incentive to
issue a GCO

Kcy Finding[s}

Auditors issued
relacivcly fewer
GCOs ro largcr
clients
compared to
smaller clients
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Mutchler el al.
[1997J
(Archi va!)

208 U.S.
public
companies
entering
bankruptcy
from 19741985 and
1990- 1994

Whether the
auditor
issues a
GCO

Louwers
[1998]
(Archiva!)

806 stressed
U.S. public
companies
from 1984'·
1991

Whether the
auditor
issues a
GCO

Francis and
Krishnan
[ 1999]
(Archiva!)

2,608
observations
from U.S.
public
companies,
1986-1987

Whether the
auditor
issues a
GCO

Rosman et al.
[1 999]
(Experimental}

13 audit
seniors and 10
audit managers
from four Big
6 firms

Going
concern
judgment

Press coverage
and client
violations of
loan covenant

Volume 29

Wal l Street
JoumaJ
coverage of
client debt
covenanl
violations and
payment
· defaults was
positively
associated with
the frequency of
GCOs
Auditor
Auditors focus
economic
on client
incentives
c!ulracteristics
and distress
ralhcr than
auditor
economic
incentives or
litigation risk
when evaluating
clients as going
concerns
Magnitude of
Audilors were
accruals
more líkely to
issue GCOs for
high-accrual
t-i rms thnn for
low-accrual
finns
Stage of
· financ.ial health
organizational and stage of
development
developmem
(start-t1p,
both impact
mature),
auditors'
financia!
acquisition or
health
nonfinancial and
(bankrupt,
financia!
non-bankrupt) information;
Correct going
concern
judgments are
associated wi tb
acquisition of
less information

2010
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Behn et al.
[200 1]
(Archiva!)

148
manufacturing
firms receiving
GCOs from
1992 to 1995,
and 148
"stressed" nonGCO firms
from the same
Lime period

Whether the
auditor
issues a
GCO

Management
plans to sell a
significant
¡¡mount of
equiry, bonow
money, and
reduce
spending

Carcello and
Neal [2000]
(Archiva!)

223 distressed
U.S. public
companies
during 1994

Whether the
auditor
issues a
GCO

Distressed
clients' audit
committee
proportion of
affiliuted
directors

Reynolds and
.:. Francis [2001]
(Archiva!)

2,439
distressed U.S.
public
companies
audited by the
Big 5

Whether the
auditor
issues a
GCO

Client size and
financia] ratios

49 Austra!ian
companies that
went bankrupt
from I9891996

Whelher Lhe
auditor
issues a
GCO

Non-audit
fees, financia]
distress

~

~

Sharma and
Sidhu [2001]
(Archiva!)

•'..

GCOs are not
associated with
management' s
plans to redt1ce
spending, but
are influenced
by
management' s
plans to sell
equity and/or
borrow money
Inverse
relationship
between
proportion of
ufriliated
directors and
auditors'
propensity to
issue GCOs
At the local
office leve!,
auditors were
more likely to
issue a GCO lo
relaLively large
clients
Auditors were
less likely to
issue a GCO to
clients that pay
relatively high
non-audit
service fees and
to clients with
low Altman
Z-scores

Joumal nf Accounting U teramre
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Ireland j2003]
(Archiva!)

9,304 U.K.
pub líe
companies
from 1998

Whether the
auditor
issues a
GCO

Joe [2003J
(Experimental)

90 in-¡;harge
auditor::; from
one
international
pu blic
accounting
firm

Vinbility
(conlinue,
fail); Audi r
opinion
(dean,
GCO,
disdaimer);

1

Volume 29

Client
characteristics

Large clients
were less likely
to receive orher
modified
opinions, but
were more
Jikely to receive
GCOs; Large
auditors were
more Ji kely to
issue GCOs; no
firm size effect
on other
modified
opinions
Whether there , Negative press
coverage
was press
covernge of
increased the
loan default
likelihood
info~mation
audiwrs will
issue a GCO

oc
probability
eslimate;
Perceived
audi t
litigation

Butler et al.
12004)
(Archiva))

7,093 firmyear
observations
from
Compustat
firms
(excluding
ulilities and
· financia!
services firms)
that reccived
GCOs between
1994 and 1.999.

risk
WhetJ1er the
auditor
issues a

oco

Abnormal
accruals

GCO clients
have Jarge
·.negali ve
accruals that are
likely due to
severe finnncial
distress rather
than earnings
management

Gi.1·sel, Roberrson, Stej'cmiak
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Carey and
Simnelt l2006]
(Archiva!)

1,021
Australian
public
companies in ·
1995

Arnedo et al.
[2008]
(Archival)

1,261 firmyear
observations of
Spanish
bankruptcyfil ing
companies,
1993-2002

Basioudis et aL
. . [2008]
..(Archiva!)

29 fi nancially
distressed
public U.K.
companies
with GCOs,
2003, anda
matched
sarnple of
fi nancially
distressed
companies
without GCOs
68 financially
distressed
Australian
companies
with GCOs,
1994-1997,
a matched
sample of
distressed
companies
without GCOs

.~

Whether the
auditor
issues a
GCO

Audit partner
teuure

Whethcr thc

Discretionary
accruals

auditor
issues a
GCO

-

-'

Carey et al.
[2008]
(Archiva!)

and

Whether the
auditor
issues a
GCO

Non-audit fees
and audit fees

Auditor.
change

Whether the
company
received a
first-time
GCO;CPA
finn size

73

Client size is not
a signil'icnnt
variable in
predicting
propensity Lo
issue a GCO for
Australian
financiallydistressed
companies
Companies with
GCOs were
more likely to
have lower
discretionary
accrullls, while
companies with
olher
qualifications
were more
likely lo have
higber
discretionary
accruals
No significan!
con·elation
between clienl
size and GCO

Companies
receiving GCOs
were of similar
size compared
to companies
that did no!
receive GCOs

74
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Herbolm and
Ragunathan
[2008]

(Archiva!)

Matched
sample of60
Australian
companies
with GCOs and
60 with other
modified
opinions

Whether the
auditor
issues a
GCO

Accruals,
persistence,
and financia!
distress

Volume29
Negative GCOaccruals relation
that is driven by
GCO f irms due
to their greater
financia!
distress and
audit litigation
risk.

Gissel, Robemon, Stefaniak
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Panel B: GCOs and Forecasting Bankruptcies (Section 3.2)

Study
(Method)
Bell and
Tabor [1991]
(Archiva))

Koh [1991)
(Archiva!)

Sample
131
observations
from U.S.
public
companies
that received
GCOs from
1979-1984 and
a matched
sample of
1,367
companies
with clean
opinions
165 brulkrupt
companies and
165 matched
non-b~nkrupt

Dependent
Va riable[s]
Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

lndcpendent
Variable[s]
ROl, inventory
intensi veness,
receivables
intensiveness,
short-term
liquidity, and
financia!
leverage

Conditi.onal
probability of
nonbankruptcy

Financia! ratios

Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

Default status,
financia! ratios

Whether tbe
client fails
subsequent to
GCO

Whether auditor
issues a GCO

companies
from 19781985
. Chen and
Church
[1992]
(Archival)

Citron and
Taffler [1992)
(Archiva])

127 u.s.
public
companies that
received firsttimeGCOs
from 19821986 anda
matched
sample of 127
non going
con eem
companies
107 failed
U.K.
companies,
~977- 1986

1

Key
Findin_g[s]
Return on
investment,
short-term
liquidity,
leverage,
inventory-tosales, and
recei vab tes-toin ventory can
be used to
forecust
GCOs

Bankruptcy
prediction
models can be
useful to
audilors in
making going
concem
assessments
Auditors
tended to issue
GCOs to
clients in
default of debt
covenants;
however,
defau lt was
nota good
indicator
bankruptcy
No support for
self-fulfilling
propbecy, as
only 24
percent of
clients
receiving
OCOs failed.

76
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Bíggs et al.
[1993]

(lnterviews)

Hopwood et
a!. [1994]

(Archiva!)

Cormier et al.
[1995]

(Archiva!)

1 partner and
1 manager
from an
intemational
publlc
accounting
firm

GCO
judgment

Financia!
knowledge,
event
knowledge,
procedural
knowledge

118 stressed
and 16 nonstressed U.S.
bankrupt
public
companies and
a control
sample of 80
stressed and
80 non-stressed nonbankiuptcy
U.S. public
companies
from 19741985

Unconditional
probability
that company
will be
incorrectly
classified as
non-bankrupt
(bankrupt),
weighted by
cost of
misclassi fying
bankrupt

Estimated
misclassificalion
cost

138 companies
racing
financia!
difficulties and
112 nonfailing
companies.

V olume 29

The auditor' s
intimate
knowledge of
client
operations and
industry was
important in
deciding
whether to
issue a GCO
Auditors'
abiliry to
identify
distressed
elients was
equivalent to
that of the
bank:rtlptcy
models

(non-

bankrupt)
firmas nonbankrupt
(bankrupt)
GCO
prediction

Client
quanti.tative and
qualitati.ve
characteristics

'Coml>ining
both

quantitative
and qualitarive
· characteristícs,
Logit,
discriminant
analysis, and
recursi ve
parútioning
models all
pro vide
consistent
predictive
abili ties

Lenard et al.
[1995]
(Archiva!)

40 U.S. public
companies that
received
GCOs fTom
1982-1987,
and a matched
sample of
unqualified
opinion
companies

Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

~

~ Geiger et

al.

[1998j

e-

(Archiva\)

.;

77

Gissel, Ro!Jertson, Stefmriak
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-

Foster et al.
[1998]

(Archiva))

!

153

u.s.

pubJic
companies that
received a
first-time
GCOfrom
199{)-199 1 and
a control
sample of 197
non-GCO
stressed
companies
126 (95)
bankruplcy
(nonbankruptcy)
U.S. public
companies
from 19881993

Whether Lhe
company
filed for
bankruptcy

Whether the
company filed
for
bankruptcy

Ratio of cash
tlow frorn
operacions to
totalliabilities;
Currenl ratio;
Ratio ofnet
worth to total
liabilities; Ratio
of long-term
debt to total
assets; Ratio of
totalliabilities
to total assets;
Ratio of net
income befare
laxes to net
sales; Ratio of
net income lo
total assets;
Whether the
company had a
priory_ear loss
Presence or
absence of a
tirst-time,
undeserved,
GCO

Tite nellral
network model
using a
generalized
reduced
gradient
(GRG2)
oplimizer had
the highest
prediction
accuracy at
95 percent

Loan defaults,
debt covenant
violations, and
GCO status

GCOs are not
n significant
predictor ·of
bankruptcies if
the forecasting
model also
includes loan
defau lts and
debt covenant
violations

First-time
GCOs are
associated
with a higher
Jikelihood of
bankruptcy
than non-GCO
companies

78
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Lennox
[1999]
(Archiva!)

160quoted
UK companies

from 19871994 that
entered
administr.ttion,
liquidation or
receivership.

Whether the
company
failed (issued
final annual
report a year
before
bankruptcy)

Number ofU.K.
quoted
companies in
population that
entered
bankruptcy that .
year, changes in
business
confidence,
industry,
. number of
employees,
financia! ratios

'
~

The audl!
report did not
signal useful
incremental
informatíon
about the
probability of
bankruptcy
when
controlling for
public
information
about the
economic
cycle,
company size,
and industry
sector
Bankniptcy is
most likely in
the first year
following a
first-time

Louwers et al.
{1999]
(Archlval)

231 public
companies that
received firsttime GCOs,
19&4-1991

Whether the
client enters
bankruptcy

Time since frrsttime GCO

Casterella et
al. [2000)
(Archiva!)

lOO publicly
traded
companies that
filed for
bankruptcy
during the
period 19821992
58 U.S.
bankrupt U.S .
public
companies
from 19891990, anda
matched
sample of nonbankrupt
companies

Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

Predicted
probability of
bankruptcy
resolution

GCO
prediction

Fuzzy clustering Whlle both
compared with a models were
Hybrid system
high.ly
accurate, the
hybrid model
displayed
superior
.predictive
ability; the
fuzzy clusters
cannot be used
on a companyby-company
basis

GCO

Lenard et al.
[2000]
(Archival)

Auditors were
unable to
predict fi lings
or resolutions
of
bankruptcies

20 10

Riley el al.
[2000)
(Archiva!)

79
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!35 firms
receiving
GCOs from
1989 to 1992.

Whether the
auditor issues
a follow-up
GCO

Management
actions such as
sales of assets,
issuance of new
debt, and
employee
layoffs

!

Resulls
suggest that
management
action
variables
provide
incremental
information
beyond that
provided by

sununary
;.

·· ' Arnold et al.
[2001)
(Case study)

44 upper-level
and 41 lowerleve]
insolvency
expcrts from
Australia

GCO
judgment

lnsolvcncy
expertisc

'
..

financia!
statement ratio
me asures
Auditors did
not possess
sufficient
expertise
concerning
clienl
insolvency to
properly
consider nonfinancia!

Behn et al.
[200 1]
(Archival)

148
manufacturing
firms
receiving
GCOs from
1992 to 1995,
and 148
"stressed"
non-GCO
fmns from the
same time
period

Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

Management
plans to sell a
significant
amount of
equity, bon·ow
money, and
reduce spendíng

information in
GCO
judgmenls
GCOs are not
associated
wil'h
management' s
plans lo
reduce
spending, but
are influenced

by
managen1ent' s
plans to sell
equity and/or
borrow money

Journal ofA ccormting Lilemtm·e
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Cítron and
T affler [2001]
(Archiva))

124
índependent
non-financia!
companies that
entered
bankruptcy
from 19871994

Whether the
company filed
for
bankruptcy

Whether the
auditor issues a
GCO

Tucker et al.
[2003]
(Experimental
Economics)

160 students at
a large U.S.
midwestern
uuiversity

Whetherthe
auditor issues
aGCO

Self-fulfill ing
prophecy and
forecast
inaccuracy

Whether the
company filed
for
bankruptcy

Time frame wilb
respect to end of
3-year
mandatory audit
firrn retention
period

-

Vanstraelen
[2003]
(Archiva!)

·392 large
Belgian
companies
. from 19921996 including
bankrupt,
stressed and
non-stressed

Volume29
Companies
whose auditors
disclosed
going concern
uncertainties
are no more
likely to fail
than those
without such
disclosures
When the
inítial forecas t
suggested
business
failure,
·auditors
typically
sacrificed
future profits
and issued
GCOs
Clients were
four times
more likely to
switch
auditors at the
end of the
mandatory
term if they
received a
GCO in the
final year of
the Belgian
mandatory
three-year
retention
period

2010

Nogler [2004)
(Archiva!)

~

81

Gissel, Robertson, Stefa niak

55 companies
that
successfully
resolved
GCOs, 19851991, and a
matched
sample of
non-GCO
companies

Whether
auditor is
correct to
remove GCO

Status of
company: active
and publiclytraded,
bankruptcy filer,
merged,
acquired, or
gone prívate,
and gone out of
business

1

Au ditors are
correct to
remove GCO
in the majority
of case, as 7 1
percent f
resolv~(iCO

clients remain
ae ti ve or were
acquiredmost c lients
who
successfully
resolve GCOs
do not appear
subject to self-

fulfilling
Carey et al.
f2008]
(Archiva!)

--

68 financially
distressed
Australian
companies
with GCOs,
1994-1997,
and a matched
sampleof
distressed
companies
without GCOs

Auditor
change

Whether the
company
received a firsttime GCO; CPA
fmn size

prophecy.
Companies
receiving a
GCO were 110
more likely to
fail than
companies not
receiving a
GCO.

Vo lume 29
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Panel C: Audilor Characteristics (Section 3 .3)

Study
(lvletlwd)
Mutchler ::md
Williams
[1990)
(Archiva!)

Sample
1,870 u.s.
public
companies
in 1987

Dep end ent
Variable[s]
Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

Independent
Variable[s]
DISCRIM
(general
propensity
of any company
to receive a
GCO} and·
TRlSK (total
returns variance
of a company's
stock over 24
mo nth prior
period)

Ponemon and
Schick [199 1]
(Survey)

86 audit
managers
from one
· national
public
accounting
ftrm

Perception of
clienl based on
12 decline
characteristics
(centralization,
no long-term
planning,
innovation
curtailed,
scapegoating,
resistance to
change,
tumover, low
morale, loss of
slack,
frngmented
pluralism, ioss
of credibi li ty,
non-prioritized
cuts, and
conflict)

Client fina ncia!
condition (good/
healthy or poor/
distrcssed)

.,

.

Key
Finding[s]
When the
audit process
in vo lved
highlystmctured use
of tcchnology,
auditors have
more difficulty
reaching a
cansen sus
concerning
'whether a
GCO is
appropriate
Six
characteristics
associated
more with
distressed
firms: no longterm planning,
scapegoating,
tumover, low
morale, loss of
sla.ck, and
non-prioritized
cuts

2010

Asare [ 1992]
(Experimental
)

Gisse/, Roberrson, Stefaniak

70 audit
parrners and
managers
f'rorn four
Big 6 public
accounting
firms

Difference
between
initial
judgment and
judgment
after relevant
pieces of
evidence
llave been
evaluated;
Type of
opinion
issued

Order of
evidence
(contrary
m.itigating
versus
mitigating
contrary);
Framing of
inilial
hypothesis
(either a fail ure
or viable
hypothesis
condition

100 audit
partners from
one firm

GC
judgments

Order in which
evidence
received (causal
or workingpaper arder);
Whether
evidence
supports a
GCO

;·~

Ricch.iute
[1992]
(Experimental
)

·-

....

-

- Bonner[I994]
.

( Experimental)

Published GCO Task
formation
complexity
studies that
used
experimental
methodologies

Judgment
performance

83

Auditors <u·e
susceptible to
recency effect
when
considering
whetller to
issue a goiJ1g
concem
opinion;
recency frame
was present
for both
hypothesis
frames (fai lure
or viable
cl.ient)
Participnnts
were more
(less) Iikely Lo
conclude a
GCO was
appropriate
when strongest
evidencc for a
GCOwas
received in
causal
(working'
paper) arder
Differences
in task
complexity
across GCO
experiments
likely accou nt
fo r so me of
the differences
in results
among these
studies
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Carcello and
Palmrose
[1994]
(Archiva!)

655 p ublic
companies
that declared
bankruptcy
from 1972 to
1992 that
were with Big
8 companies .

Auditor
litigation

Presence and
persistence of
GCOs

Ho [1994]
(Experimental
)

156 auditors
from four
international
public
accounting
firms

GCO
judgments

Months of audit
experience

Líkelihood
that company
wou ld remain
a going
concern

Knowledge
distinctiveness,
knowledge
abstractness,
knowledge
contingency

Choo [ 1996]
(E xperimental
)

58 audítors
from
· intemational
accounting
firms

Volume 29
GCOs were
usefu l in
lirn iting,
defending, and
weakeniug
plaintiffs
claims against
auditors when
ciients declare
ban.kruptcy
Auditors with
both high and
low levels of
experience
fai led to reach
a consensus
concenúng
going concern
judgments
Experience
helps auditors
identify
atypical audit
events, which
influences
auditors' GCO
judgments
more than
typical events;
Auditors who
exhibit larger
extent of
knowledge
abstractness
make belter
GCO
_iudgments

2010
LaSalle and
Anandaraja n
[1996]
(Survey)

208 U.S. audit
partners from
various types
ofpublic
accounting
firms

N!A

N/A

183 U.S. audit
partners frorn
various types
of public
accounting
firms

Opinion type
used to
express GCO

Auditor's
experience, CPA
frrm size, Public
vs. prívate
campany,
Company's
total asscts

·,
LaSa11e et al.

[ !996]
(Experimental
)

<
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Gissel, Robertson, Steftmiak

The client's
negalive
attributes
weremore
important than
its positive
attributes
when
considering
issuing a
GCO; auditor
litigation risk
provides
incentive t.o
issue aGCO
Auditors
tended to
select
disclaimers
when litigation
risk is higher,
and when
clients have a
greater
proportion of
negative
attributes than
positive
attributes

Journal ofAccounting Litcrature

86

Louwers
[1998]
(Archival)

806 stressed
U.S. public
companies
from 19841991

-.

Whether the
auditor iss ues
aGCO

Client going
concern
disclosure;
estimmed
bankruptcy
probability of
client; audit
tirm's clients
lost during the
previous year;
number of years
auditing firm
has been
engaged by
client; presence
of either
publiclydisclosed debt
defanlt on debt
covenants or
significan!
uncertainties
involving client,
alleged damages
tiled in audit
failure litigation
against auditing
firm in the
previous year,
client fina ncia!
condition

V olume 29

Auditors focus
on client
characteristics
and distress
rather than
auditor
econonúc
incentives or
litigation risk
when
evaluating
clients as
going
concerns

Gissel, Robertson, Stefaniak

2010
Rau and

Moser [ 1999]
(Experiment)

·'

120 seniors
from Big 5
accounting
firms

Likelihood to
issue GCO

Other task
(posilive,
negntive,
and control)

316U.S.
public
companies
bctween
1987-1991

Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

Partner
compensation
plan and client
size

~-

1

~;

;

-Carcello et al.
[2000)
·-(Archiva!)

87

When
provided with
an identical set
of
infonnation,
seni ors who
perfonned
another audil
task for which
the underlying
facts of the
case retlected
positively
(negati vel y)
on the
compuny' s
viability,
subsequently
made going
concern
judgments that
were relatively
more positive
(ncgative)
Partners with
compensation
plans with

emphasis on
local office
profits were
more sensitive
lo client size
when deciding
whether to
issue a GCO

Joumal ofAccounting Literature
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Anandarajan
et aL (2001]
(Archiva!)

Opinion type
used to
express
GCO

523 U.S.
public
companies
in 1996

Geiger and
Raghunandan
[2001}
(Archiva!)

Reynolds and
Francis [2001]
(Archiva!)

. 1

383 bankrupt
. companies
from 1991
to 1998

2,439
distressed
U.S. public
companies
audited by the
Big 5

Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

V olume29

Under going
coneem
uncertainties,
auditors were
more líkely to
issue a
disclaimer
than add an
explanatory
pacagraph to
an unqualified
opinion to
larger clients,
when auditor
1enure was
shorter, and
client financia!
stress was
greater
Whether PSLRA . Auditors were
less likely to
is in effect
issue prior
GCOs for
b'ankrupt
companies
after the
passage of
the Prívate
Securities
Litiga !ion
Reform Act
of 1995
Client size and
At the local
financia! ratios
office level,
auditors were
more tikely to
issue a GCO
to relatively
large clients
Client size and
fmancíal ratios

2010

¡

Gissel, Roberrson, Srefalliak

Sharma and
Sidhu [2001]
(Archival)

49 bankrupt
Australian
companies
from 19891996

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

Altman z- score;
Ratio of nonaudit fees to
total fees

Ashton and

135 staff
auditors
from one
Big 5 public
accounting
firm

GC
judgmenls

Task processing
(step-by-step
judgments,
end-of-sequence
judgment, or
judgments with
debiaser
decision aid)

1,158
financially
distressed
companies
in 2001

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

Ratio of nonaudit fees lo
total fees; Audit
and non-audit
fees paid

1,871 U.S.
public
companies
under
fmancial
stress during

Whether the
Regulatory
auditor issues · change
aOCO

~ennedy

[2002]
...(Experimental
)'

DeFond et al.
·-(2002]
(Archi val)
~-

-

Geiger and
~Raghunandan

[2002a]
(Archiva!)

89
Auditors wcre
less likely to
issue a GCO
to clients that
pay relativety
high non-audit
service fees
and to clients
withlow
Altman
Z-scores
A self-review
technique
eliminaled
recency effect
in staff
auditors'
going concern
judgments
GCOs did not
relate to audit
fees, non-audit
fees, total fees,
or the rati o of
non-audit to
total fees
GCOs were
less likely
after each
successive
regulatory
change

1992-1993,

Oeiger and
Raghunandan
[2002b]
(.Archíval)

1996-97, and
1999-2000
171 public
companies
th<it filed for
bankruptcy,
1996-1998

Whether t~e
auditor issues
aOCO

Auditor tenure

.Auditors are
less likely to
issue OCOs as
auditor tenure
increases

Volume29
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Vanstraelen
[2002]
(Archiva!)

Geigcr and
Rama [2003]
(Archiva!)

Ire land [2003]
(Archiva!)

392 Jarge
bankrupt
Belgian
compmlies
rrom 19921996, anda
matched
sample of
non-bankrupl
companies
66 financially
distressed
manufacturing
companies
wilh GCOs
and year-ends
September 30,
2000February 28,
2001 , anda
matc hed
sample of
financially
distressed
manufacturing
companies
without GCOs

Whether the
auditor iss ues
aGCO

Audit fees;
Ratio of number
of clients lost or
gained by audit
finn during
previous year to
annual number
or firm clients

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

Audit fees; Nonaudit fees

9,304 U.K.
pub líe
companies
from 1998

Whether the
auditor issues
aG CO

Client size and
CPA firm size

..

Auditors were
less Jikely to
issue a GCO
to clients that
pay relatively
high audit fees
and when the
audit firm had
recently lost
market share
Companíes
w ith higher
audit fees
were more
l.i kely to
receive
GCOs t.han
companies
with lower
audit fees,
however
neither nonaudit fees nor
the ratio of
non-audit fees
to audit fees
relate to
GCOs
Large clients
were less
likely lo
receive ot.her
modified
opinions, but
wcrc more
likely to
receive GCOs;
Large auditors
were more
likely to issue
GCOs
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!

Tuckeretal.
[2003]
(Experimental
Economics)

160 students
ata large
midwestern
university

Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

Self-fulfilling
prophecy and
forecast
inaccuracy

Vanstraelen
[2003]
(Archiva!)

392large
compmlies
from 19921996
íncluding
bankmpt,
stressed and
non-stressed

Whether the
company
filed for
bankruptcy

Time frame wilh
respect to end of
3-year
mandatory audit
tirm retention
period

233
nonventurebacked
microcap
IPOs, 19931994

Pre-JPO GCO
issued and
stock delists
within 2 years
ofiPO OR
Prc-IPO nonGCOand
stock is not
delisted
within 2 years
ofiPO

CPA firm size
and coverage
(e.g., local
versus national);
Audít firm
(indicator
variable for each
of Big 6 firms)

, ..~.

-1
~-

Weberand
-Willenborg
[2003]
(Archival)
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When the
initial forecast
suggested
business
failure,
auditors
typically
sacrificed
future profits
and issued
GCOs
Clients were
four times
more Jikely to
switch
auditors al rhe
end of the
mandatory
term ifthey
received a
GCO in the
final year of
a mandatory
(Belgium)
three-year
retention
period
Big 6 firms
more likely
issue pre-JPO
GCOs and
pre-IPO
opinions are
more
informa ti ve
about
post-IPO
performance
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Blay [2005]
(Experimental
)

Geigeret al.
[2005]
(Archiva!)

48 audit
managers
from three Big
4 firm

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

226 bankrupt
companies
from 2000-

Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

2003
'·

Wertheim and
Fowler [2005]
(Archiva!)

696 Chapter
11 bankrupt
companies
between
1997-2001

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

FavereMarchesi

109 partners
and 71 senior
managers
from six
largesl U .S.
accounting
finns

Belief
revísions

694 bankrupt
U.S. public
companies
fmrn 199 I 2001

Whether the
auditor issues
aOCO

[2006}
(Experimental
)

Geiger el al.
[2006]
(ArchivHl)

'
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Auditors were
more (Jess)
likely to issue
GCOs when
the threat of
losing the
client is low
(high), and
when l.itigatíon
risk is high
(low)
Auditors were
Whether audit
more likely lo
opinion issued
after 12/31/2001 issue GCOs
. afte r
December 31 ,
2001 (SOX)
Auditor type
Non-BigN
{Big N or not)
firms were
more likely to
issue GCOs
than Big N
frrms
Temporal
. Auditors
ex.hibited
evidence arder
recency effecl
(indicative of
favorable trend,
bias when
iudicative of
evaluating
unfavorable trend, going concem
or no temporal
evidence;
order); Evidence Varying
presentation orde r temporal order
( negative/posi ti ve and
or
presentation
positive/negative) lessened the
recency effect
Regime (pre- or
Auditors'
post- PSLRA);
propensity to
Auditor typ·e
issue GCOs
(Big N or not)
decreased
following the
Private
Securities
Litigation
Reform Act,
especially
amongBigN
auditors
Threats lo
independence
(more/less) and
risk of litigation
(high/low)
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Geiger and
Rama [2006]
(Archiva!)

Guiral and
Esteo [2006]
(Experimental
)

J
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1

1,042 firsttime GCOs,
1990-2000
and 710
public
companies
that filed for
bankruptcy,
1991-2001
81 Spanish
auditors and
104 graduate
audit students

¡ The
probability of
Type l and
Type ll audit
error&
involving
GCOs

Belief
revision and
audil reporL
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Whether the
at1ditor is Big N

No11-Big N
firms have
higher Type I
and Type JI
error rates
involving
GCOs than
Big N firms

When audit.
reports were
processed;
Whether
auditors
believed the
framework was
viable or not;
Auditor
experience

Recency effect
such that
auditors who
read positive
information
about the
client at Lhe
end of the
information
:;et were less
likely to issue
go¡ng concern
opinions; audit
experience did
not mitigate
recency effect
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Lam and
Mensah
[2006]

(Archiva!)

148 Hong

Kong public
companies
receiving
GCO, 1998-

Opinion type
used to
express
GCO

2000

-

Carey and
Simnetl
[20061
(Archiva!)

1,021

Australian
public
companies in
1995

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

Bond and bank
defaultibank
credit
withdrawal;
Controlling
shareholders' or
holding
companies'
assets being
frozen by the
state or the
leading bank;
Refusal of
furt11er support
by state
governmenl or
controlling
sbareholders;
Appointment of
liquidator by
major
creditors/major
creditor initiated
winding up;
Partition/princip
al ban.ks
submitted writs
and deman.ds for
repayment;
Failure to meet
restructuring
(recovery)
agreement
Audit partner
tenure

Volume 29
In a low

litigation: risk
environment,
auditors
tended to issue
disclaimers of
opin.ion rather
than modified
unqualified
opinions as
financia!
di stress
increases

In verse
relation
between
auditor tenure
and Hkelihood
auditor wiU
issue a GCO
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LaS aHe

NIA

[2006]
(Discussion of
Lam and
Mensah,

NIA

N/A

1

1
1

1

2006)

1

l
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Ettredge et al.
[2(}07]
(Archiva!)

Auditor
dismissals
announced
from January

-

December

-.

Whether the
clienl
dismisses the
auditor

Whether the
auditor issues a
GCO

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

Financia]
dislress; CPA
firm size; Finn
economic
dependence on
the client

through
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Suggests that
when litigalion
risk is low,
auditors may
issue
disclaimers ln
convey GCOs
because the
profitable
auditor-client
relationship is
unlikely to
continue, and
the auditor
essentially has
little Lo lose by
disclaiming an
opinion
The presence
of a GCO is
positively
associated
with auditor
dismissals

2004
Hunt and
~•;lseged

[2007]
'(Archiva!)

996 firm-year
observations
of financially
distressed
companies
with non-Bíg
N auditors,
2001-2003

A higher
proportion of
polentially
financially
distressed
clients of aonBig 5 auditors
receive going
concem

reporls, and
that non-Big 5
auditors are·
not less, if not
more, likely to
issue a GCO
to their larger
clients
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Knechel nnd
Vanstraelen
[2007]
(Archiva!)

Basioudis et
al. [2008]
(Archiva!)

Carey eL al.
[2008]
(Archiva!)

309 prívate
bankrupt
stressed

Belgian
companies,
1992-!996,
and rnalched
sample of
non-bankrupt
stressed
companies
29 financially
distressed
public U.K.
companies
with GCOs,
2003, anda
marched
sample of
financially
. distressed
companies
wilhout GCOs
68 financially
distressed
Australian
companies
with GCOs,
1994-1997,
and a matched
sample of
distressed
companies
without GCOs

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

Length of
auditor/client
relationship;
Indicator
variable if
auditor tenure
gremer than
3 years

Auditor tenure
does not
impact the
líkeW10od that
auditors issue
GCOs

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

Non-audit fees
and audit fees

Companies
with higher
non-audi t
(audit) fees
were less
(more) likely
to receive
GCOs

Auditor
change

Whether the
company
received a
first-time GCO;
CP A firm size

'

Companies
receiving
GCOs were
more likely to
switch audit
finns than
companies not
receiving
GCOs
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Lim and Tan

1,692

[2008]

distressed
firm-year
observations,

(Archiva!)

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

2000-2001

1

>

J

Robinson

rioo&J
-{-Archival)

209 firms
filing for
Chapter ll
bankruptcy

Whether the
auditor issues
a GCO

92

Whether the ·
auditor íssues
aGCO ·

Non-audit fees;
Client' s
percentile rank
1 of non-audit fees
given audit
firm's to tal fees;
Total fees;
Industry
specialization as
(1) continuous
mensure of
mnrket share,
(2) largest
markel share
and at least LO%
higher than
second lnrgest
auditor, and
(3) market share
greater than or
equal to 24%
Tax sen•ice fees

·..

Callaghan
et al. [2009]
(Archival)

bankruptcyfiling U.S.
companies,
1 January 1,
2001-March
16, 2005

Audit fees; Nonaudit fees; Ratio
of non-audit fees
to total audit
fees
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Greater nonaudit fees
increase
industry
specialists'
likelihoodto
issue GCOs,
but not nonspecialisl:'l'
likelihood lo
issue GCOs

The Jevel of
tax serv ices
provided by an
audi! fi.rm for
an audit client
was positively
associated
with the audit
firrn's
likelihood of
issuing a
correctGCO
Auditors'
likelihood to
issue GCOs
díd not relate •
to non-audit
fces; audit
fees, total fees,
or the ratio of
non-audit LO
total fees
'

1.
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Lai [2009]
(Archiva!)

Li [2009]
(Archiva)}

3,642 firmyear
observalions
of financialiy
distressed
companies,
June 1, 1999June 30, 2002

Whether lhe
audilor issues
aOCO

Pre/Post fee
disclosure
requirements
mandated by the
SEC (in 2000)

1,681

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

Ratio of client
aurut fees to
office total
revenue; Ratio
of client nonaudit fces to
office total
revenue; Ratio
of client total
fees to office
total revenue
Auditor
expenise

distressed
companies in
2001 and

1,780
distresseo
companies in
2003

Reichelt and
Wang2010
(Archiva!)

2!,583
lirm-year
observalions
ofnontinancial
domestic 2003
to 2007

Whetber the
auditor issues
aGCO

Volume29

Audit finus
were more
likely to issue
GCOs when
there is
required
disclosure of
fees than when
there is not
required fee
disclosure
Post-SOX,
auditors are
more likely to
issue GCOs
for clients
with relatively
greater
proportion of
audit fees at
the audit firm
office level
Auditors with
industry
experlise are
more lik.ely to
issue GCOs

3.1 Characteristics of Clients Receiving GCOs
If compani:es that receive a GCO share similar characteristics, identifying
those characteristics could help auditors and stakeholders foresee a company's
going concem. Prior resem·ch generaJly suggests that a set of specific client
characteristics are associated with GCOs; even to such an ·extent that Louwers
[1998] suggested tbat auditors focus on client characteristics and distress rather
than auditor economic incentives or litigation risk wben evaluating clients as a
going concern. GCO clients tend to be in violation of debt covenants [Chen and
Church,, 1992] and have Iow Altman Z-scores [Shanna and Sidhu, 2001]; however, Behn et aL [2001] found that auditors' going concem reporting decisions
are associated with management' s voluntarily disclosed plans to alleviate financia! distress (i.e., increase ownership equity, bonow money or restructure
debt, and reduce spending or dispose ·of assets). Rosman et al. [1999] found
that whether the client is bankrupt ahd whether the client is a start-up or a mature company influences the extent of auditors' evidence collection when
evaluating GCOs. Concerning evidence evaluation, negative client attributes
are more intluential than positive attributes [LaSalle and Anandarajan, 1996].
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Other research has examined the relationship between client size and
GCOs. For instance, evidence from the U.K. suggests that large client:s are
more likely to receive GCOs than small clients [lreland, 2003]. However,
Carey et al. [2008] and Basioudis et al. [2008] both report no relation between
compan ies (in Australia and the U.K., respectively) receiving GCOs and firm
size, while larger firms in the U.S. appem· less 1ikely to receive GCOs [McKeown et al., 1991 ], particularly when accounting for the size of tbe client relative
to the size of the local office [Reynolds and Francis, 2001]. One ex:planation
for the differcnce in tindings may líe in the control variables that are used in
these studies. Ireland [2003] included audit and non-audit fees, audit firm size,
and plior GCO as control variables, while McKeown et al. [1991] did not inelude these control variables. Forther, Carey and Simnett [2006] controlled for
several financial distress variables and also found that client size is not a signi;ficant variable in predictin g propensity to issue a GCO for Austrajjan financiillly-distressed companies. Ne vertheless, given tbe difference between U.K
and U.S. findings, future research could consider whether differences in the
regulatory environment or risk Ievels to the auditor help explain the contradictory findings.
We identified one study that examined the association between auditors'
propensily to issue GCOs and distressed clients' audit committee composition.
Carcello and Neal [2000] found that auditors were less likely to issue GCOs as
ttí~ proportion of affiliated directors increased~ they defined affiliated as client
eniployees, related party employees, fonner employees, and other individuals
with a relationship with lhe client. Future research could investigate other issues relating to GCOs and client corporate governance. For instance, does the
pFesence of a financiai expert, as required by SOX [U.S.H.R., 2002], influence
auditors' propensity to issue GCOs? Other corporate governance factors that
C9.Liid influence GCO formation are frequency of' audlt committee meetings, the
number of boards on which each audit committee member serves, and length of
service of audit committee members.

3.1.1 Client Earnings Management
Earnings management refers to purposeful manipulation of externa! financia! reporting, often through accruals [Schipper, 1989]. If clíent management
encounters a going concem situation, the possibility exists that they could manage earnings to avoid the appearance of a going concern issue. Researchers
have considcred this possibility, and have investigated the relationship between
client attempts to manage earnings and the likelihood the auditor will issue a
GCO. This literature focuses on whether earnings management ·attempts influence auditors' propensíty to issue GCOs. Evidence on this issue is mixed.
Frands and Krishnan [ 1999] reported that the magnitud e of accruals is
positively associated with auditors' propensity to issue GCOs. However, Butler
et al. f) 004] re-examined this association, and found that companies receiving
GCOs· had large negative accruals that were more likely to be due to severe
finanéial distress rather than earnings management. Evidence from other jurísdictions also provides conflicting results. Herbohn and Ragunathan [2008]
found that Australian companies with GCOs have abnormal accruals of greater
magnitude than companies with other types of qualifications. In contrast,
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Arncdo et al. [2008] rep01tecl that auditors were more likely to issue GCOs to
Spanish bankruptcy companies wben discretionary accruals were lower.
At this poinl, only a handful of stuclies have investigated the association between earnings management and GCOs, and these studies seem to provide inconsislent results. Perhaps experimental research can help in this area by manipulating the reason for the abnormal accruals (to manage earnings or true
financia! distress). Additionally, since Butler et al. [2004] and Francis and
Krishnan [ 1999] used pre-SO X data, future research could investigare whether
changes in conservatism following SOX impact the relationship between the
magnitude of accruals and auditors' propen sity to issue GCOs. Finally, the
relationsh.ip between GCOs and additional earnings management matters could
be investigated (e.g., real earnings management, meeting earnings expectations,
using special income statement items).
3.1.2 Client Press Coverage
Earnings releases are only one source of public exposure that a company
expcriences; companies will often receive press coverage from media outlets
such as the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). This publicity, particularly negative
publicity, has the potential to influence auditors' going concern assessmen ts.
Using arch.ival and behavioral methodologies respectively, Mutchler et al.
l1997] and Joe [2003] provided evidence that auditors were more likely to issue GCOs foUowing negative client press coverage about debt covenant violations in the WSJ than when clients do not receive such press coverage. However, WSJ coverage does not impact the likelihood of bankruptcy [Mutchler et
al., 1997].
Joe [2003] concluded that the effect of clien t press coverage on auditors'
propensity to issue GCOs represents a reaction to known information because
her panicipants did not belie ve the press coverage increased Htigation ris.k.
Mutchler et al. [1 997] reached a similar conclusion: WSJ coverage could influence aud.ítors simply because it is a disdosure via press releasc. However, Joe
[2003] noted that disclosures tluough different media outlets.might have a different int1uence on auditor judgmeot and that press coverage providing positive
infonnntion could also influence the· auditor. Accordingly, following Joe
[2003] , future researcb could exruninc the effects .of negative publicity from
other media such as television and Internet on auditor· GCO judgments and
dccisions, and whether positive media reports about distressed clients would
decrease the likelihood of GCOs, perhaps increasing the risk of Type U errors.
3.2 GCQs and Forecasting Bankruptcies
3.2.1 Forecasting Models
.. At the time of Asare·s review, a re1ative1y mature body of research ·had exarnined issues relating to forecasting ·client bankruptcy using pubHcly-available
data .such as financia! scatement ratios. The studies included in Asare's review
indicated: that .bank.ruptcy prediction models can improve auditors' ability to
identify:fi nancially distressed companies. Research has cont1nued to investigate
this· issue, and has provided further evidence that forecasting models can im-
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prove auditors' going concern judgments and decisions [Bcll ancl Tabor, 1991;
Koh, 1991 ]. 3
Behn at al. [2001] extended Chen ancl Church [1992] by invesligating the
ability to predict going concern reports using publicly available infonnation.
Behn et al. [2001] examined management' s voluntarily disclosed plans to alleviate tlnancial distress (i.e., increase ownership equity, borrow money or restructure debt, and reduce spending or dispose of assets). They found that auditors' going concern reporting decisions are associated with cerlain management
plans as specified by SAS No. 59. Specitkally, auditors were less likely to issue going concern reports when management disclosed plans to issue equity
and to borrow additional funds (while controlling for financia! heallh, loan default status, etc.). Further, Riley et al. [2000) found that management's plans
(e,.g., dispose of assets, issue new eguüy, etc.) can provide going concern resolution information to the market as to whether a company will likely resolve
th~ going concem problem.
Other studies have extended this literature by comparing the merits of various models to forecasl client distrcss. Cormier et al. [ 1995] used a modcl comprised of several quantitative and qualitative va1iables to predict going concern
opinions. They found that logit, discriminant, and recursive partitioning models
are all able to discriminare failing from non-failing finns. Lenard et aL [1995]
investigated the abiJity of one logit model and two neural network models to
determine wbether auditors shou1d issue GCOs, and found that the neural netw¿rk model using a generalized reduced gradienc {GRG2) optimizer has the
highest prediction accuracy (95 percent).
Lenard et al. [2000] compared the relative accuracy of two types of GCO
m?dels: a fuzzy clustering model and a hybrid model. The fuzzy clustering
model uses fuzzy logic to group data using subjective reasoning rather than
precise values. The hybrid model incorporates both quantitative (i.e., using
státistical modeling) and qualitative (i.e., using an expert system) information.
Lenard et al. [2000] reported two advantages of the hybrid model. First, while
both models are highly accurate, the hybrid model is more accurate than the
fuzzy clustering model. Second, the professional appeal of the fuzzy clustering
model likely has Iimitations because it cannot analyze distress on a company~
by-company basis.
In addition to using forecasting models, auditors also can rely on their own
intimate k.nowledge of the client, client industry, client management characteristics, the reliability of management for~casts for the next period, and ·actual
events when forecasting client distress and deciding whether to issue GCO
[Biggs et al., 1993]. Tbus, in addition to lhe client'·s financia! condition, ad:.
verse conditions such as downtums in the client industry or overly optimistic
management forecasts can influence going concern judgments. However, Arnold et al. [200 1] suggested that auditors ought to exercise caution when con:.'
sidering sucb non-financia! information because specialists with greater experi~
ence rpjght be better able to identify distressed clients. 'Further, Arnold et aL
[2001] asserted that auditor judgrnents concerning client distress are compara2

.
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For :r. recent revicw of bankruplt."Y prediction rnodels and going concem prediction models, pleas¿
refer lo Campbcll el al. [2008].
·
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ble to those of inexperienced solvcncy spccialists, a comment that furthers
Chen and Cbmch's [1992] findings. While auditors appear to rely on loan defaults (i.e., noncompliance with lending agreements or missing scheduled payments) when decidíng what type of opinion to issue, default s tatus is nota good
indicator of impending firm faiJure [Chen and Church, 1992].
Other research focuses on whether GCOs are effective predictors of bankruptcy. At the time of Asare's review, research indicated that auditors' GCOs
are often less accurate than models in predicting bankruptcy. Severa! studies
provide similar evidence. Foster et al. [1998] found that GCOs actually are not
a significant predictor of bankruptcies if the forecasting model also includes
loan defaults and debt covenant violations, and concluded that future resea.rch
should use these variables as controls when examining GCO effectiveness in
bankruptcy forecasting. Fu.rther, Lennox [ 1999] tound that bankruptcy prediction models can be more accurate than audit opinions, and that audit opinions
do not signal useful incremental information about tbe probability of bankruptcy when controlling for public information about the economic cycle, company s ize, and industry sector. Finally, Casterella et al. [2000] noted that sorne
companies that declare bankruptcy successfully reorganize, but they also found
that auditors were unable to successfully predict bankruptcy filings or resolutions. One study provides evidence suggesting that auditors' GCOs and forecasting models predict bankruptCies with the samc level of accmacy [Hopwood
et al., 1994]. ln addition, first-time GCOs are associated with a higher likeHhood of bankruptcy tban non-GCO companies [Geiger et al., 1998].
The resea.rch on forecasting GCOs leads us to coriclude that auditors, perhaps with the assistance of solvency specialists or models, issue GCOs with a
relatively high degree of accuracy using financial statement ratios, other pubIicly-available data, and knowledge tbe audüor possesses about the client.
However, many unans wered questions remain. For instance, while the Lenard
et al. [2000] hybrid model and the Lenard e t al. [1995) nenral network are accurate predictors of GCOs, are they practica! decision aids? Lenard et aL
[1995] do note that their model should be tested by auditors. Do auditors possess sufficieot tecbtúcal expertise to use these models? lf not; what degree of
training is required, and would lhe model pass cost-benefit considerations? To
what extent do audit íirms actually rely on bankruptcy prediction models in
practice, and would a GCO flag triggered by a bankruptcy prediction model be
sufficient evidence for an audilor to issue a GCO? If audieors are not willing to
use sucb models, what factors drive those decisions?
3.2.2 The Self-FulfiUing Prophccy
Sorne problems arise when evaluating the ability of GCOs to predict client
bank.ruptcy. First, the GCO is not designed to be a prediction of bankruptcy,
but ratber to express the auditor's concern about the client's ability to continue
in existence [AICPA, 1988b]. Second, -research is conflicting as to wbelher
GCOs result in a self-fulfiJling prophecy (i.e., the GCO opinion incre.a ses the
ükelihood the client will fail). Sorne studies have provided evidence tbat supports such a self-fulfilling prophecy [e.g., Tucker et al., 2003; Vanstraelen
2003]. Specifically, research suggests that first-tirne GCOs are associated with
a higher likelihood of bankruptcy compared to non-GCO companies [Geiger et

2010

Gissel, Robemon, Stejimiak

103

al., 1998], and that firs t-time GCOs are more likely to result in bankruptcy in
the first year following the GCO than in later years rLomvers et al., 1999).
However, both Citron and Taffler [2001) and Carey ct al. [2008] found that
companies with GCOs are no more likcly to fail than those without such disclosures, and Cítron and Taffler [ 1992] found that only 24 percent of GCOclients subsequently fail. Similarly, Nogler [2004] found that auditors are correct to remove GCO in the majority (71 percent) of cases, indicating that most
clients who successfully resolve GCOs do not appear subject to self-fulfilling
prophecy. Additionally, Citron and Taffler [200 l l found that it is the degree of
financial distress that drives both bankruptcy and the auditor's going concem
disclosure. Given these conflicting results, l'uture researchers could attempt to
resolve the discrepancy arnong these studies, and determine whether the selft;ulfilling prophecy exists.

3.3. Auditor Characteristics
3.3.1 Auditor Economic Incentives
3.3.1.1 Audit Fees, Non-Audit Fees, and Auditor Independence
Several studies have exanüned auditor economic incentives by determ.ining
wliether audit anci/or non-audit fees in1luence GCO formation. These issues
have critical implications for auditor independence and the regulatory environment because the U.S. government has legislated restrictions for non-audit
services [SOX - U.S.H.R., 2002]. Accordingly, regulators should períodically
reevaluate sucb restrictions, and academic research should help inform s uch
assessments.
1
--Before reviewing research on the relationship between audit fees and auditors' propensity to issue GCOs, we first consider a.study that examines the relationship between the disclosure of audit fees incr~ses auditors' propensity ro
issue GCOs. Lai [2009] exarnined GCOs both befare and after the Securities
and E xchange Commission (SEC) required disclosures of audit fees in 2000 as
a way of protecting auditor independence [Lai, .2009]. Lai [2009] found that
audüors are more likely to issue GCO~i when they must disdose fees than when
fee disclosure is not mandated, and concluded:that,J ee disdosure is ,associated
with improved auditor independence. Other research provides a different way
of considering auditor independence. Tlús liteiature· investigares the relation· ·
ship between fees and GCOs, research using ~'tLS ::data provides 'nuxed resnlts.
. : '·
Callaghan et al. [2009] and Defond et al. [20021 ~fouud that non-audit fees, audit fees, total fees, and ratíos of non-audit fees to' total fees do not- influence , \\ ..
auditors' propensity to issue GCOs. However, ' 6ther research s uggests thal
. .. .
-:., .....-.."
higher audit fees -are positively associated with GCOs. [Geiger and Rama;
, · :·
2003]. .and that non-Big N auditors are more like1y to issue GCOs:to clients· --.<~. •
with higher ratios of non-audit fees to total fees [Hunt and Lulseged, 2007].
;}f.;~;
More recent srudies have attedmp thed hto reconcil~ the. di~fer~nces idn .findinghs . -~ ·.·:~_:;.·-.:.~; ~~
Lim and Tan [200 8] investigare w et .e r auditor spectabzatmn mo erates t e
..
rel ationship between non-audit fees and auditors' likelihood to issue GCOs. · ::~~1\,{
... ,... ..: ~-.
..
~

,
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They found that industry specialists are more lik.ely to issue GCOs when nonaudit fees are higher but non-audit fees do not impact non-specialísts' likelihood to issue GCOs. Li [2009] examined the association between audit fees
and GCOs al the firm office level. She found that auditors are more likely to
issue GCOs to clients with a relatively greater proportion of audít fees at the
office leve!, suggesting that auditors' independence might not b e impaired in
the post-SOX environment. Concerning tax fees specifically, Robinson [2008]
found a positive associnlion between the level of tax sen•ice fees and the Iikelihood of auditors correctly issuing GCOs. Robinson [2008] contended, therefore, that restricting tax services could diminish audit quality when tbe audit
firm also provides tax services. Perhaps the knowledge of the client gained
through providing tax services irnproves auditors' GCO decisions. Coilecti vely,
evidence from the U.S. is rnixed concerning the relationship between non-audit
fees, audit fees, and their influence on auditan;' propensity to ÍS$Ue GCOs.
Research from other jurisd1ctions provides more cons1steot results suggesting that non-audit fees reduce the likelihood auditors will issue GCOs. Sharma
and Sidhu [200 l] used a sample of bankrupt Australían companies and found
that companíes with hígh ratios of non-audit to total fees were less líkely to
receive GCOs. Similar!y, using U .K. data, Basioudis et al. [2008] found that
companies with higher levels of non-audit fees were less likely to receive
GCOs. Sorne potential explanations for the contlictíng results from studíes in
the U.S. and other jurisdictions include possible differences in litigation and
regulatmy environments in dífferent countries and sample time period used.
For ínstance, Sharma and Sidhu's [2001] Australi~ sample covers 1989
through 1996, while CaUaghan et al.'s [2009] U.S. sample covers 2001 through
early 2005. Therefore, it is unclear whether SOX, other regulatory changes
o ver time such as Jitigation reform in the U.S. (see .our section 2.0), or other
factors contribute to differences across studies that vary both by jurisdiction
and by ti me perlod.
The relationship between fees and independence continues to be important
given the SOX-imposed ban on many non-audít services [U.S .H.R., 2002].
Accordingly, we believe severa! fruitful oppo1tunities for future research remain. For instance, all research to-date investigating GCOs and non-audit services has included prc-SOX data. Future researcb should examine purely postSOX periods to deternúne if early results concerning GCOs and non-audit services still hold in the post-SOX period. Additionally, following Lai [2009],
future research could consider whether allowing expanded non-audit services,
but requiring auditors to disclose all fees, would improve independence. Finally, .fi.1ture research could investigate other potential sources of increased
independence in the formation of GCOs. For example, does requiring an engagement quality reviewer to provide an opinion regarding a client' s going
concern status, separate from the engagement team's going concern evaluation,
i.ncrease independence?
·
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3.3.1.2 Trade-offs Between P•·ofitability and Litigation Incentives

In this subsection, we shift from a foc us on audit fees to economic incentives for both profitability and avoiding litigation. Profitability incentives relate
to audit fees, but we view the literature we review in this section as different in
scope because the focu s is on issues such as the potential to lose clients based
on audit judgments and decisions, whereas the focus in 3.3.1 .1 was specifically
on audit fees. Our focus in this subsection is the body of research conceming
the trade-off between two economic incenti ves that can conflict with one another: profitability incenrives and litigation risk incentives. On one hand, the
auditor is a rational actor with economic incentives to attract and retain profitable clients [Gendron, 2002; DeAngelo, 1981]. Conversely, the auditor h~u;
incentives to conduct audits in accordance with professional standards to
~pimize litigation risk [Reynolds and Francis, 2001]. 4 This conflict is promine?t during opin:ion formation because auditors can lose clients and future profits when they issue GCOs [e.g., Carey et al. , 2008; Ettredge et al., 2007; Vanstraelen, 2003] . However, auditors potentially face costly litigation if they fail
to modify the opinion when the client' s financial statements or financia] condition merits a departure from the clean opinion [Carcello and Palmrose, 1994].
LaSalle and Anandarajan [1996] found that the majority of audit partners indicate l.itigation risk is important in the GCO decision, and about half of the surveyed partners view Htigation risk as highly important oras sufficient alone to
justify a GCO.
·
- Several studies show that auditors respond more to litigation risk than lo
profitability incentives. In an experimental economics study, Tucker et al.
[20031 found that audit opinions reflect a desire to adhere to professional responsibility, which typically decreases litigation risk. They found that when
ay_I:Iítors' initíal judgments indicate that the c!ient will fail to continue as a going concem , auditors gencrally issued GCOs, even though such an action Jikely
meantlosing the client. Reynolds and Francis [2001] investigated the economic
incentives of tbe audit firm's local office by measuiing the size of the client
relative to the size of the local office. 5 They fou nd no evidence that profitability
incentives influence auditors' GCO decisions. Indeed, Reynolds and Francis
[200 1] found that auditors were more likely to issue GCOs for relatively large
clicnts, which the authors interpreted as evidence of a positive association between the propensity to issue GCOs and litigatíon risk because larger clients
carry greater litigation risk. An experiment conducted by Blay [2005] provides
support for this intcrpretation, as he found that auditors were more likely to
issue a GCO when litigation risk is high than when litigation risk is low.
Changes in litigation risks following regulatory developments also can motívate GCOs. The PSLRA {1995) and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (1998), which jointly reduce aud.itors' legal liability for public company audits [e.g., Geiger a nd Raghunandan, 2001], decreased auditors ' propensity to · issue GCOs [Geiger et al., 2006; Geiger and Raghunandan, 2001,
4
In addiúon lo the economic incentive lo avoid litigation , auditor.; havc incentive to avoid lhe loss of
reputatioo that accompanies litigation [Reynolds and Francis, 200 11.
s Scc Reynolds and Francis [200 l] for a discussion of litigation concems lhal accompany la rgc c lients.
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2002a]. This effect was especially pronounced for .Big N firms (Geiger et al.,
2006], wh.ich carry sizable legallíability involving large public clients.~
.
Other studies investigated the role of Jitigation risk in thc manner m whtch
auditors convey GCOs (i.e., modified unqualified or_ disclaimer), pr~vi~i~g
evidence that auditors who beJieve GCOs will protect fmns from legal babJ.hty
tended to disclaim when Htigation risk was high because the client was large,
public , and/or the extremity of the financia! discress was high [Anandarajan et
al. , 2001 ; LaSalle et al. , 1996].
Results from less litigious jurisdictions provide corroborative evidence that
Jitiooation risk affects GCOs. Lam and Mensah [2006] fou nd that e ven in the
low-litigation Iisk e nvironment of Hong Kong, auditors were more likely to
issue disclaimers when client distress was severe. However,. Lam and Mensah
[2006] found no relationship between client size and the use of a modified unqualified or dísclaimer to disclose the GCO, futther strengthening the case that
U.S. auditors' methods of conveying GCOs could be partly attributable to litigation risks. In a discussion of Lam and Mensah [2006], LaSalle (2006] suggested that when litigation risk is low, auditors may issue disclaimers to conve y
GCOs because the prot1table auditor-client relationship is unlikely to conrinue,
and the aud.itor essentially has little to lose by disclaiming an opinion. This
analysis suggesls that profitability incentives could be at work as well. Indeed,
several studies indicare that profitability incentives influence lhe issuance of
GCOs under certain circumstances. Carcello et al. [2000] found tbat partners
with compensation plans more heavily linked to local offíce performance are
more sensitive to client size when deciding whether to issue GCOs . They found
that such partners are less likely to issue GCOs to large clients than are partners
wíth compensation plans more heavily linked to .overall firm peli"onnance.
Concerning the relationship between client distress and GCOs, Blay [2005]
found that when a distressed client threatcns to switch audit firms, auditors
were Jess likely to issue GCOs than if the client" does not threaten to switch
audit tirms, inclicating a desire to retain tbe client and the associated audit fees.
Concerning the Australian market, Carey and Simnett [2006] found that
auditors were less I.ikely to issue GCOs as auditor tenure "increases, and interpreted this result as an indication of an inverse reJationship between audit qualíty and auditor tenure. A related but different interpretation of Carey and Simnett [2006] is that auditors are sensitive to profitability incentives when deciding whether to issue GCOs. This interpretation to l1ows DeAngelo [1981] , who
argued that auditors "low-ball" [p. 113] on the initial engagement because of
~11arket forces, and gradually raise audit fees over time to recover the lost profJts from the early e ngagement[s]. Therefore, auditoni could hesitate to issue
GCOs ~s. tenure i_ncreases because. they have reached a position in which they
areTeahzmg proflts, and do not wtsh lo lose the client in favor of a new client
with 1ower audit fees. This assertion is consistent with our revíew of resea.rch
concerning consequences of GCOs to auditors (4.2), which suggests that GCOs
can prompt _the client to switch audi'tors (and place the auditor in a position to
lose the audlt revenue from that client).
6

• Picase scc our section (2.2.2) on the e ffccts of laws and regu lmions on GCO fonnati on for more
.
dtscusston ol these und other t-egulatory devclopmems.
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Evidence from Belgium, another low-litigalion risk environment [Vanstraelen, 2002], suggests that unlike in Hong Kong [Lam and Mensah, 2006],
the frequency of GCOs reflects auditors' profitability incentives. Vanstraelen
[2002] found an inverse relationship between audit fees and auditors' propeusity to iss ue GCOs. Additionally, Vanstraelen [2002] found that auditors who
ha ve lost market share in the previous year were less likely to issue GCOs.
There is also evidence that auditors operate outside the infl uence of econonüc incentives when making GCO decisions. Louwers [1998] found that,
when evaluating the client as a going concern, auditors emphasized client financial condition rather than profitability or litigation concerns. In conclusion,
prior research on the conflicting economic incentives of profitability ancl Jitigation suggests that either or both of these incentives can influence auditor judg.~m,ents under certain circumstances, and that changes in the regulatory environment influence GCO frequency [Geiger et al., 2005; Geiger and Raghunandan,
2001, 2002]. Future research should investigate whether the regulatory changes
of the first decade of the 2l sL century have irnpacted the trade-off between profitabi1ity incentives and litigation risks, as the majority of U.S. research reHes on
data that predates SOX. Further, how have the recent financia! ctisis and ensuing government bailouts influenced GCO formation? For instance, if the auditor is aware a company will receive federal assistance (e.g., TARP funds), does
the auditor consider that information when determining whether a GCO is appr;opriate?
¡ Future research also should rep1icate Blay [2005] in arder to advance our
understanding of the conflict between the economic incentives of protitability
and rninimizing litigation exposure. Blay [2005] found that both profitability
i.I}.centives and litigation risk influence auditor GCO judgments, but did not find
e';'idence of an interaction. However, Blay [2005] concluded that his profitability manipulation may have been weaker than the iitigation risk manipulation.
Future researchers could increase the salience of the profitability incentive by
explicitly mentioning the amount of revenue the accounting firm would lose if
the client switched audit firms, perhaps as a percentage of total fmn revenues.
A related issue is the effect of a different way of reporting GCOs on litigation~
For instance, if auditors provided a probability of GCO rather t11an an opinion
expressing doubt about the client's ability to continue to operate, would litigation risk increase, decrease, or not change?
3.3.1.3 Audit Firm Size
It is reasonable to expect that audit firm size will be positively related to
the propensity to issue GCOs, given that prior research suggests tbat large
firrns provide higher quality audits (for a review, see Francís [2004]). Severa!
studies provide evidence consistent with this expectation. Weber and WHlen- ;~~
borg [2003] found that Big N audit frrms are more likely to issue pre-IPO
GCOs: than other audit firms. Sirnilarly, using data from the U.K., Ireland
[2003] also found that large audit frrms are more Iikely to issue GCOs than .. ).
small audit fums. Geiger and Rama [2006) found tbat non-Big N firms have ::.
higher Type I and Type 11 error rates involving GCOs than Big N firms, consi~; :~C
tent with higher quality frorn large finns. However, for companies that eventu~ ~ ·:~"-...

;·~~-

·.
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ally tile bankruptcy, it appears that non-Big N tirms are more likely to issue
GCOs tban Big N tirms (Wertheiro and Fowler, 2005].

3.3.2 Auditor Cognitive Processes and GCOs
As with forecasting client bankruptcy, a relatively rnature body of reseru·ch
had investigated auditor cognitive processes preceding GCOs at the tim~ of
Asare's revíew. These studies included in Asare's review focused on a vanety
of topícs such as hypothesis framing, order effects and belief revis~o~, and the
recall of relevant information. Over the last two decades, the maJonty of research on auditor cognition and GCOs has focused on order effects _and belief
revision, i.e., whether the order in which auditors receive evidence mfluences
going concern judgments [e.g., Favere-Marchesi, 2006; Asare, 1992]. This
research suggests a recene y effect bias in auditors' GCO judgments [FavereMarchesi , 2006; Guiral and Esteo, 2006; Ashton and Kennedy, 2002; Asare,
1992].
Some studies shed additional light on this apparently robust phenomenon.
For instance, Ricchiute [1992] found that not only does the sequential order
matter, but that partners are more (less) lik.ely to conclude a GCO was appropriate when strongesl evidence for a GCO was received in causal (workingpaper) arder. Bonner (1994] took a different approach to examirung the relarionship between auditor cognitive processes and GCO formation . She analyzed severa] published articles that experimentally investigare GCO formation,
and rated each on the complexity of the experimental task. Bonner [1994] concluded that differences in task complexity across GCO experiments likely account for some of the differences in results arnong these studies, and proposed
that future research consider manipulating or controlling for task complexüy in
GCO formation experiments. Research from other jurisdictlons also has exarnined order effects in GCO formation, as Guiral and· Esteo [2006] found that
Spanish auditors also exhibit a recency effect during GCO formation .
The literature also provides evidence that recency effects are robust ro several potential moderators, including hypothesis framing as either viable or failing [Guhal and Esteo, 2006; Asare, 1992] and auditor experience [Guiral and
Esteo, 2006]. While the recency effect in going concern judgments appears. to
representa common, robust occutl'ence, decision aids can mitigate this potential detriment to audit quality. Ashton and Kennedy [2002] found that a simple
decision aid can eliminate recency effects in going concern judgments: staff
auditors who made a final probability revision following a prompt to consider
alJ evidence were not susceptible to recency effects in GCO judgments. In addition, the results of Favere-Marchesi [2006] suggest that another simple decision aid is to prompt auditors to consider both the presentation order and the
chronological order of evidence, as he found that auditors who consider
chrónological order were less susceptible to recency effects.
?ne study s uggests that profession~ demands to balance multiple clients
can mfluence auditors ' cognitive processes on specific clients. Rau and Moser
[1999] found that when auditors are provided with an identicaJ set of information, seniors who performed anothér audit task for whlch the underJying facts
of the case reflected positively {negatively) on the company's viábility, subse-
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guently made going concem judgments were rclatively more posilive (negative).
A final area of cognitive research concerns the weighting of audit evidence.
LaSalle and Anandarajan [1996] foond that auditors place more emphasis on
negative than positive client attributes during GCO formation. Perhaps auditors
tend to be risk-averse when deciding whether to issue a GCO because of potentiallitigation concems involved with issuing a clean opinion for companies that
fail. Sorne specific negative atttibutes auditors associate with client distress
include lack of long-term planning, scapegoating, management turnover, low
morale, loss of budgetary slack, and non-prioritized cuts [Ponemon and Schick,
1991].
In summa.ry , our review of the literature involving cognitive processes in
gping concem judgments generates the following conclusions and potential
dir~ctions for futw·e research. First, while auditors cu·e susceptible to recency
eff~crs when forming going concem judgments [e.g., Favere-Marchesi, 2006;
Asare, 1992], simple decision aids such as a prompt ro consid'er all evídence
coUectively after reviewing the evidence [Ashton and Kennedy, 2002] or considering the chronological arder of eviderice [Favere-Marchesi, 2006] can mitigare recency effects. Although investigating the role of arder effects on auditor
judgrnent is a relatively rnature field of study, opportunities for future research
remain. For instance, thc participants in the Ashton and Kennedy [2002] study
w~re staff auditors. Jf partners and managers, who are more likely to evaluatc
cliclnts as going concenis, consider all evidence collectively befare making a
judgment, would recency effects remain? Further, does the timing of the decision aid influence its effecti veness concerning GCO judgments? Would similar
res_plts occur if the auditor receives the prompt befare evaluating any evidence?
. Second, an auditor's initial hypothesis concerning client viability or failme
does not appear to mitigate recency effects [Asare, 1992]. Third, auditors atténd more to negative information about the dient than to positive information
in going concem settings [LaSalle and Anandarajan, 1996]. However, as Guiral
and Esteo [2006] observed, profitabili.ty incentives and litigation risk can int1uence evidence weighting (c.f. , o ur section 3.3.1.2). Do audilors in some situations, perhaps in response to economic incentives, attend more to positive infOtmation items to avoid alienating the' client? Finally, is it possible that arder
effects interact on sorne leve! with olher engagement risk factors (e.g., litigation risk, reputation risk, etc.) to influence auditor GCO formation?

3.3.3 Auditor Expertise
It is reasonable to expect that as an auditor's expertise in an industry
grows, so does their ability to interpret the financia! health of a business embedded in that industry. Accordingly, in this section we review Hterature that
has investigated whether auditor expertise is associated with GCO formation,
issuance, and accuracy. Conceming auditors' expertise, Chao [1996] found that
more e·xperienced auditors were able to make better going concern judgments,
in part, by being able to identify atypical audit e vents as well as by having a
Jarger extent of knowledge abstractness. Further, Reichelt and Wang [2010]
found that auditors with greater industry expertise were more Hkely to issue
GCOs. However, auditor tenure, which is one manner to gain industry exper-
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tise, is not associated with audítors' propensity to issue GCOs to stressed Belgian companies [Knechel and Vanstraelen, 2007], but is negatively associated
with auditors' propensity to issue GCOs [Carey and Sinmett, 2006;. Geiger and
Raghunandan, 2002b]. SOX requires audit partner rotation every five years,
which provides an opportunity for future research to examine whether partnerspecific tenure influences GCO issuance. In addition, future research could
examine the GCO formatíon in a group setting (similar to recent researcb on
fraud risk brainstorming), or how engagement partners and additional technical
advi sors help form the GCO opinion.
4.0 CONSEQUENCES OF GCOS
In this seclion, we review literature conceming the consequences of audit
opínions for client stockholders and creditors, as well as for audit fmns. Specifically, we sununarize a group of studies conceming the use, perceptions, and
impacts of GCOs. At the time of Asare' s review, the literature generally focused on the impact of GCOs on client equity reactions and yielded núxed results concerning whether GCOs actualJy are infmmative to the market. The key
issues in this section are the consequences of GCOs for audit clients (4.1 ), clienl stakeholders (4.2) and the audit flrm (4.3). While it seems intuitive that
GCOs would yield negative market reactions, research on this issue does not
always support that outcome. Additionally, it also seems intuitive that a client
will be more likely to dismiss an auditor following a GCO. Howúer, tl).e literature we review indicares that the relationship between GCOs and auditor
switching is more complex tban it núght appear at first glance. Table 3 sumrnarizes the studies that investigate issues pertaining to the consequences of
GCOs.
TABLE 3: Consequences of GCOs (Section 4.0)
Panel A: Consequences ofGCOs to the Client (4.1)

Study
(Method)
Nogler
[1995)
(Archiva!)

Sample

377 u.s.
public
companies
that received
GCOs from
1983-1991

Dependent
Variable[S]
Resolution of

GCO

..
..

.

;""

lndependent
Variable[s]
NIA

Key
Findúzg[s]
About one. third each of
those with
complete data
went through
bankruptcy,
changed fonn
through
dissolution or
merger, or
subsequently
received.clean
opinions
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Krislman
and Yang
[2009]
(Archiva!)

1,077 public
companies
with
observations
from 2001·
2006

Audit report
lag; Earnings
nnnouncemenl
lag

Ye<1r; Whether
company
receives GCO

'

J

.

--

The new
disclosure
requiremenl
incrcased audit
report Jags
both
immediately
before and
afler it \:vent
into effecl;
GCOs are
positively
associated
with audit
reporl lags and
earnings
announccmcnt
lags

Panel B: Clients Stakeholder Reactions to GCOs (Section 4.2)

!¡

Study

(Method)
Fields and
Wilkins [ 1991]
·· (Archiva!)
-~

.

~

-

Fleak. and
Wilson [1994]
(ArchivaJ)

Sample
52 withdrawn
opinions
announced
between 1978
and 1987

495 firms wíth
going concem
qualifications
frorn 1979 to

1986

Dependent
Variablefs]
Abnonnal
returns

Abnormal
relurns

Independent
Variable[s]
NIA

Whether the
company

recei\'ed a
GCO;
Whether
GCOis
unexpected

Key
Finding[s]
Firms
experienced
a positivc
abnormal
return on thc
day GCOs
were
withdrawn
Fim1s that
received an
unexpectedGCO
experience
abnorma!
security retums
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Kwon and Wild
[1 994]
(Archiva!)

Journal of Accounting Literature

100 u.s.

public
companies
that received a
first-time
GCOfrom
1989- ¡ 99 l.
and a control
sample of 96
non-GCO
coropanies

Abnormal
returns

Chen and
Church [1996)
(Archiva!)

56 (42) firms
filing for
bankruptcy
lhat received
unqualified
{going
concern)
opinions

Firm's
retum for
accumulation
period Iess
return of
same size
decile
portfolio for
accumulation
perlad

Jones
[ 1996)
(Archiva!)

68 audit
reports of
going concern
uncertainties
and 86
unqunlified
audit reports
from
financially
distressed
firms

Abnormal
returns

Whether the
company
received a
first-time
GCO

Volume 29

First-time
GCOsare
informalive:
companies
receiving firsttimeGCOs
experience
abnormal
reactions
during each of
the two years
preced.i ng the
GCO
Whether the
GCOs are
m;eful in
company
received a
explaining
GCO
excess returns
occurring
around
bankruptcy
filings; GC
firms
experience less
negative excess
returns than
other firms in
three-, fi ve-,
and seven-day
windows
surrounding
bankruptcy
· filings
Whetherthe
Mean abnormal
campany
returns
received a
surrounding the
GCO; the
release of the
market' s
auditor' s report
assessment of was negative
for firms which
probability
firm will
· received GCOs
receive a
and positive for
GCO
distressed firms
whicb received
clean opinions
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and Wild [ J996]
(Archiva()
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25,160 ll.S.
public
company
firm-quarter ·
observations
from 198 1-

Earnings
cocfficient

Whether the
company
reccivcd a
GCO

Whether the
auditor issues
aGCO

Crcditors'
decisions of
whether to
wnive initial
debt covenant
violations

Daily
security
return

Wbether thc
company
received a
GCO

1990

Wilkins [1997]
(Archiva!)

5

159 firms
traded on the
NYSE/AMEX
or NASDAQ,
and hav ing
initial default
dates ranging
from 1978 to

11 3

Going concern
status is
infom1ative:
the likelihood
of recei ving
GCOs is
inversely
related to
earnings
persi:.tencc
Creditors are
less likely to
waivc initial
debt covenant
violations if rhe
auditor issues a
GCO

1988

Carlson et al.
[1998}
(Archiva!)
¡
'

-·

Morris and
Stawser [1999]
(Archiva])

88 GCOs
issued lo U.S.
public
companies
from 1981 to
1988, and a
matchcd
sample of
stressed nonGCO
companies
232
companies
( 116 closed
and 116
non-closed)
Texas banks
between 1990199 1

Significam
negative
market return
for going
concern

Closed status
of bank

Whether tbe
company
reccived a
GCO

companies
relat.ive to
stressetl
companies tJwt
did not receive
GCOs
Bank
regulators are
more likely to
allow a bank to
continue
operating if che
bank received a
modified
opinion
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Holder-Webb
and Wilkins
[2000]

(Archiva!)
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217 firms that
fi led for
bankruptcy
1975 and 1996

Stock returns

Whether SAS
No. 59 is in
effect

Whether
stock is
delisted
within 2
years ofiPO

Whether lhe
company
received a
GCO

...

¡f:

,.•

,_

Willenborg and
McKeown
[2000]
(Archiva!)

270 small
NASDAQ
!POs,
1993-1994

"

'

'
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Bankruptcy
surprises
associated with
SAS No. 59
GCOs are
significanti y
smaller than
bankruptcy
surprises
associated with
both SAS
No. 59 clean
opinions and
SAS No. 34
·GCOs;The
difference
between the
going concern
bankruptcy
surprise and the
clean opinion
bankrup tcy
surprise under
SAS No. 59 is
greater than !he
corresponding
difference
under SAS
No. 34
Organizations
that received a
GCO at iPO
are more likely
to be delisted
within two
years of the
IPO dale; The
GCO helps
uninfonned
investors
because it
reduces the
amountof
uncertainty

Gis.~ el,

201 0

Blay and Geiger
[200 1]
(Archiva!)

Elias and
Johnston
[2001 ]
1
{Experimental)

121 U.S.

public
companies
receiving
first-time
GCOs during
1990-1992

285 U.S.

commercial
loan officers

_j

Roberrson, Sre.faniak

Abnormal
returns

Whether finn
subsequenliy
goes bankrupl

Credit
recommendation,
Con[ideuce
leve!,
Bankruptcy
likelihood

Audil report
with going
concern
explanatory
paragraph
versus
standard
report with no
explanatory
paragraph

Probability
of lending
mouey to
company,
i nterest rate ·
to charge,
perceived
ability to
service debt,
and
likelihood
company
will continue
as going
concem

Report format
('except for'
quaJified,
'emphasis of
matter plus
note
identifying
going concern
issue,
standard)

--

1

.Bessell et al.

122

[20031

participants
received an
ungualified
report and
108 received a
modified one
and they were
surveyed on
the report

O~xperiUJenta l )

liS

Abnormal
returns for
compa.nies thal
eventually
went bankrupt
were higher
than for
companies tl1at
did not
eventually go
bankrupt
Explanatory
paragraph
indicating
going conccrn
uncertainty
does not
provide
additional
information
and does not
influence loan
officers'
assessments of
bank:ruptcy
Modified audit
reports did
not have
incremental
information
content to
financia!
statement users
- once a going
concern
contíngency is
disclosed, the
explanatory
paragraph in
the auditor's
report did not
convey new
information
.: ~

·.·
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PuchetaMartinez et al.
[2004]
(Archiva!)

154 Spanish
companies
with audit
qualifications
from 19921995

Abnormal
returns

Whetherthe
company
received a
GCO

Taffler et al.
[2004]
(Archiva!)

Explore the
medium-term
price reaction
to going
concern audit
report
disclosures by
London Stock
Exchange over
caleñdar year
1153 highly
experienced
financi a!
analysts were
asked how
often they use
company
performance
for decision
making

Abnormal
returns

Length of
time (months)
after GCO
issued

Stock price
estimations

Líkelihood of
recovery from
auditors
(insura!fce, no
insurance),
audit opinion
(standard
unqualífied,
going concem
modified),
and opinion
of índustry
specialists

O'Reilly et al.
[2006]
(Experimental)

Volume29

Modified audit
opinions did
nothave
information
value for
Spanish
investors
The market
underresponded to
the issuance of
bad news in the
medium-term

The extent to
which the
environment
perceived the
auditor as an
insurer
moderated the
effect of a
going concem
on investor
judgments

2010

Schaub [2006a]
(Archiva!)

Gissel, Rubel"tsun, Sreflmiak

79 announcing
firms from
1984-1996

Abnormal
rerurns

Electric
service firms

Abnormal
retums

,.
~~

Schaub [2006b]
(Archiva!)

.

'

-·
·Jir:erbohn et al.
[2007]
(Archival)

anno~ncing

GCOs in lhe
major
financia!
media,
1984-2004
Medium-term
rnarket
reaction to
first time
GCOs in the
12 months
before and
after
disclosures for
the Auslraliao
Stock
Exchange

Abnormal
returns

11 7

Actual return;
Retum on
CRSP
equallyweighted
market
portfolio

Investors
overrcacted to
the
announcement
ofa GCO;
Announcing
finns often
offered share
buy-back
programs
immediately
following a
GCO; 70%of
the average
loss was
recovered
within five
days ofthe
announcement
Actual return A contagian
effect was
on
announcement present intrada y
industry for a
firm lhat
received a
GCO

Whether the
company
received a
first-time
GCO

Evidence of a
medium-term
adverse effect
for first-time
going concern
recipients prior
to the
announcement;
however, the
adverse impact
did not persist
subsequent to
the

announcement
. . .. ?
-,

...

;.¡~ ~

:~¡
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Ogneva and
Subramanyam
(2007]
(Archiva!)

11 59 GC
opinions for
the U.S. from
1993-2004
and 91 GC
opinions in
Australia from
2000-2004

Citron et al.
[2008]
(Archiva!)

91 cases on
the London
Stock
Exchañge of
companies
issuing these
opinions from
1994-2000

Aldhizer III et
al. f2009]
(Archiva!)

713 u.s.
pu blic
companies
that switched
auditors
during 20042005
Matched
sarnple of
German public
companies
fro m 19961997 and
l999-2000: 28
firm-yea.rs
receiving
modified
opinions and
844 firm-years
receiving
clean opinions

~:~

..

,

...

...
,..
~ ¡1

Abnormal
returns

Abnormal
rerurns

..

,

111

,..

,..
~~

Gassen and
Skaife [2009]
(Archiva!)

Abnonnal
returns

Whether the
compnny
received a
GCO

Volumc 29

No evidence to
su pport a
negative
abnormaJ
return for firsc
time going
concern
recipients in
Australia, and
U.S. findings
were sensilive
lo the choice of
expected return
The market
Whether
· reacted
forthcoming
negatively to
GCOis
annou nced ar GCO
preliminary to announcements;
no difference
the aonua\
between eariy
report
disclosure and
an nual report
disclosure of
GCOs
For companies
Whether a
GCO was
that switch
auditors, a
issued in the
GCO results in
two years
preceding the positive
auditor
abnormal
return s
chanRe
Pre/Post
Audit firms
reforms
were more
mandated by
Iikely to íssue
the German
GCOs.
government
following the
in the Act oil
German audit
Control al)d
reforms of
Tnmsparency
1998
of Enterprises
Daily
cumulative
dividend
return;
Expected
return
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Kaus::u- et al.
[2009]

(Arch iva!)

1,293 nonfinance,
nonutility
firms with
first-time GC
opinions
published
between 19932005

Abnormal

431 disLressed
U.S. public
companies
that received
11rst-tirne
GCOs during
1989-2006
and a matched
samp_le of

Market value
of equiLy

Whether the
company
received a
first-time
GCO

Abnorrnal

Whether
GCO due to
financing ·
problem;
Whether
covenanl
specífies
company
should not
receive GCO;
Institutional
ownership

retums

Market
exccss relurn;
Return on
zeroinvestmenl
factor
mimicking
portfolios for
size

,. '
,~lay et al.
-L20 101
(Archi val)

~

3070

---.
i

.. Mena n and
\Villiams [20 10]
(Archival)

distressed
companies
that did not
recei ve a GCO
1,.194
companies
with first-time
GCOs, 1995-

2006

;

returns

1

The marke t

rully responded
to the
wilhdrawal of a
going concern,
but underreacted to a
going concern
announcement
in the yem
subsequent to
the
announcement
When a
company
receives a firsttime GCO,
market
participants
shift thcir
vnluation focus
from both
balance sheet
and income
statement items
to only balance
sheet items
Compunies
experience
negati ve relums
after going
concern
announcements;
Returns are
more negative
when finam:ing
issues or debt
covenant issues
drive the GCO
or when there
is grentcr
instilulional
ownersh ip
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Panel C : Consequences of GCOs to Audir Firms (Section 4.3)

Stud_y
(Metlwd)

Dcpendent

Sample

Variable[s

J

Haskins and
Williams [ 1990}
(Archiva!)

5, 154 public
companies
with Big
Eight
auditors,
1985-1986
(3,469
comprise
learning set
and 1,685
comprise
test set)'

Audilor
change

C ill·on and
Tafller ( 1992]
(Archiva!)

107 -fai led
U.K.
companies,
1977- 1986

Auditor
change

655 public
companies
thal declared
bankruptcy
from 1972 to
.1 992 th at
were with
Bíg 8
companies.

Auditor
litigation

Cnrcello and
· Palmrose 11 994]
(Archiva!)

'

lndcpendent
Variable[S)

Opinion
(unq ualified,
subject-to,
except-for,
d!sclaimer);
Nct sales;
Percentagc
change in
sales;
Zmijewski 's
financial
di stress
measure;
Change in
ownership;
lPO ; Audit
finn industry
specialization;
Audit fi rm
expensiveness;
Audit llrm
prestige; Audit
finn quality
Whether
auditor issues a
GCO

Presence and
persistence of
modified
reports, Client
financia]
condítion,
lrregularities,
Client size,
Client industry

Key
Finding[s]
Model correctly
identified 53%
of audit
switches and
96% of cases
with no auditor
switch in the
test set; opinion
was onc of leasr
important
factors for
switching

Companies
receiving GCOs
were more
· .likely to switch
audilors within
a yenr than
companies not
receiving
GCOs.
GCOs were
useful in
limiting,
defending, and
weaken.ing
plaintiff s
claims against
audítors when
.
clients declare
bankruptcy.

2010

Krishnan [1994]
(Archiva!)

Gissel, Robertson, Ste.faniak

2,989 firmyear
observations,
1986-1987,
and a holdout
sample of 808
companies,
1988

Opinion
year befare
switch
(unqualifie
d, asset
rea'lization,
going
concem)

24 publiclyheld failed
savings and
loans, 19821989'

Whether
auditor
issucd a
non-GCO
or qualified
or
disclaimer
GCO
Auditor
resignation
s; Auditor
dismissals

~
\

J

Blacconiere and
DeFond [1997]
(Archiva!)

l(rishnan and
1{rishnan [1997]
· - (Archiva])

141 auditor
resignations,
141 industryyear matched
dismissals,
and 141
year-matched
dismissals, al!
for U.S.
public
companies
from 1989'1995

Whether there
is auditor
change year
following
opinion

12 1

·Companies
receiving
modified
opinions that
may not be
"deserved"
(based on
financia! and
market factors)
were more
likely to switcb
audit firms than
campantes
receiving
modified or
clean opinions
thm are
deserved
N/A
Going conccrn
reports in the
year prior to the
failure of a
savi ngs and
loan did not
prevent auditor
litiuation
Whether
When litigation
auditor issues a risk is bigh,
GCO;
auditors thal
issue GCOs are
Litigation risk
more likely to
resign than be
dismissed by
lhe client
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Matsumura e t al.

N/A

[1997]
(Modeling)

Geiger et al.
[!998]
(Archiva])

u.s.

153
public
companies
that received
a firsL- time
GCO fro m
1990-1991
and a control
sample of
197 non-GCO
stressed
compan ies

Client
decision to
repl ace
auditor,
Whether
incumbent
aud itor's
decision on
iss uing
GCO
affected by
possibiüty
of
replacemen
t

Similarity
between
incu mbent
auditor and
replacement
auditor

Auditor
change ;
Opinion
fro m
successor
auditor if
therc is a
switch

Presence or
absence of a
tirst-time,
undeserved,
GCO

Volume29
Audit switching
modc l s uggests
that companies
were less likely
to switch
auditors if
subsequent
auditors will
likely issue
GCOs, and that
c urrent auditors
were less likely
to iss ue GCOs
if they ex.pect
that clienrs will
switch auditors
Undeserved
first-time GCO
increases
likelihood client
will dismiss
auditor, but

switching
auditors does
not affect the
like lih ood of
removing the
GCO in ilie
fo llowing year

2010

Tucker and
Matsumura
[1998]

(Experimental)

Gissel, Robertsnn, Stefaniak

60 graduate
students or
upper-level
business
majors

Whether
auditor
issues a
GCO,
Auditor

change

Likelihood
successor
auditor will
issue clean
opinion;
Likelihood
company will
fail after
receiving a
GCO

,
1'

5

··-·
Srunt.y et al.

1,265

[2002]

companíes
that had
auditor
ratification
votes in 1997

(Archiva!)
~.

1

~

-

Investors'
votes on
auditor
ratification,
Whether in
the
toplbottom
decile of
investors'
votes on
auditor
ratificat!on

Whether
auditor issues a
GCO;
Likelihood
ofGCO

123

Increasing
likelíhood that
successor
auditors will
issue e lean
opinions and
self-fulfilling
prophecy of
GCOs does not
increase
auditors'
issuance of
clean opinions;
clients switch
auditors as
auditor
reporting varies
and the more
likely the selffulfilling
prophecy of
GCOs
Shareholder
dissatisfaction
was associated
with the
issunnce of a
GCO, and thal
even more so
with the
issuance of an
unexpected
GCO
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Carcello and
Neal [20031
(Archiva!)

62 public
companies
with
dísmissa1s
after GCOs,
1988-1999,
and a matched
sample
without
dismissals
afr.erGCOs,
nnd a control
sample of
125 (125)
with (without)
dismissals
after clean
opinions

Auditor
dismissals
by audit
committee
within one
year of
receiving
GCOor
clean
opinion

Audit
committee
characteristics
including
members
classified as
affiliated
directors,
govern ance
expertise,
fmancial
expertise, and
amount stock
ownership

Vanstraelen
t2003]
(Archiva!)

392 !arge
companies
from 19921996
including
bankrupt,
stressed and
non-stressed

Whether
the
company
filed for
bankruptcy

Time frame
with respect to
end of
3-year
miindatory
audit finn
retention
period

Volume
Companies
receiving GCOs
were more
likely than
companies
receiving clean
opinions to
dismiss auditors
if there are
greater
proportions of
affiliated
directors on
audit
committees,
audit committee
members owned
higher levels of
·stock, and audit
committee
members held
less director
posirions on
other boardsClients were
four times more
likely to switch
auditors at the
end ofthe
mandatory term
if they received
a GCO in the
final year of a
mandatory
(Belgium)
three-year
retention period

20!0
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Hudaib and
Cooke [2005]
(Archiva])

297 U.K.

public
companies
from 19872001

Auditor
change

("

j

...

:;
-

-Mong and
Roebuck [2005]
(Experimental)

;,

69 advanced
law students
participated in
a study to
give legal
counsel to
rnade up
companies

Understand
ability,
readership,
usefu lness,
and effects
of audít
report;
Recommen
dation to
pursue or
not purs~te
litigation
against
auditor;
Whether
audít repon
would be
used as
basis for
claim
against
• auditor

Audit opinion
(u nqu alified,
disclaimer,
seo pe
limilalion, GC,
accounting
treatment
disagreement,
dísclosure
matter
disagreement,
unqualified
with paragraph
on fundamental
bnt not
material
matter, subjcct
to material and
fundamental
GC. subject to
material but
not
fundamental
uncertainly);
Pre/Posl U.K.
SAS 600
Audit opinion
(unquahfied,
'emphasís of
matter' on
going concern
issue); Work
practices
dísclosure
(standard,
additional
disclosure on
work practices)

125

The likelihood
lhe el ien t wíll
switch auditors
was positively
correlated with
the severity of
modification;
Following SAS
600, which gave
U.K. auditors
the option of
issuíng GCOs
with modífied
unqualified
opinions, GCOs
were no longer
associated wiU1
auditor
switching

Modified (but
not qualified)
audít opinions
acled as a "red
flag" and reduce
potential
litigants'
propensity to
initiatc
litigation

..
; .·

;

.

..
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Carey et al.
[2008)
(Archiva!)

Ruiz-Barbadillo
et al. [2009)
(Archiva!)

Sikka [2009]
(Critica()

Journal.of Accounting Literaru.re

68 financially
distressed
Au:¡lralian
companies
with GCOs,
1994-1997,
and a matched
sample of
distressed
companies
without
GCOs
3,119
firm-year
observations
ofl,326
finañcially
distressed
public
Spanish
companies,
199 1-2000
N/ A

Volume 29

Auditor
change

Whether the
company
received a frrsttimeGCO;
CPA firm size

Companies
receiving GCOs
were more
likely to switch
audlt firms lhan
companies not
receiving GCOs

Whether
the auditor
íssues a
GCO

Mandatory
rotation period
( 199 1-1994)
compared to
postmandatory
rotation period
( 1995-2000)

Audit firms
were more
líkely to issue
GCOs under
periods of
mandatory audit
firm rotation

N/A

N/ A

Raises concerns
about audit
quaJity given
that auditors
frequen Uy
fai led lo issue
GCOs for the
audits
ilmnediately
preceding the
high-profile
bank failures of
2008

4.1 Consequences of GCOs to the Client
While a GCO is expected to have significant effects on the client, not many
studies have investigated the client-specific effects. Specifically, we found only
two sludies that shed light on the client~specific consequences GCOs carry to
the audit client. First, Nogler [1 995] provided evidence concerning sorne general outcomes to the client receiviryg a GCO. Nogler [1995] followed-up on
GCOs issued from 1983-1991 and found that about 10 percent of GCO clients
continue to receive GCOs, and abóut one-third werit through bankruptcy,
changed form through dissoiution or merger, or subsequently received clean
ópinions. Second, Krishnan and Yang [2009] found that GCOs are positively
associated with longer auclit report lags, or the time from a company's fiscal
year end to the audit repot1 date.
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4.2 Client Stakeholder Reactions to GCOs
4.2.1 Client Stockholders
As the generally accepted purpose of business is to increase shareholdcr
wealth, a more common focus of GCO researchers has been the effcct that
GCOs have on client stockholders. Jones [1996] found that GCOs impacted
financia Uy distressed tírms' stock prices such that mean abnormal ret:urns surroundíng the release of the auditor's report were negative for firms receiving
GCOs and positive for distressed firms receiving clean opinions. Similarly,
severa} studies províde evidence of negative returns followíng GCOs [Carlson
el al., 1998; Menon and Williams, 201 0], especially when the GCO is unexpected [Fleak and Wílson, 1994] or the GCO is due to financing or debt covenapt issues [Menon and Williarns, 2010]. In addition, the negative market reactiol/ to GCOs is not sensitive to whether the GCO is disclosed befare the ammal
report date [Citron et aL, 2008]. Further, Fields and Wilkins [ 1991] and Ka usar
et al. [2009] found that the market fully responded to the withdrawal of a going
concern announcement, also indicating information content in the GCO.
Subramanyam and Wild [1996] examined the informational value of GCOs in a
diffcrent manner, but their results also suggest a negative reaction to GCOs.
They computed Altrnan Z-scores as a proxy for going concern status, and
foúnd that earnings persistence is lower for companies that are likcly to receive
GCOs.
,._ Aldhizer III et al. [2009] investigated the informational value of GCOs in a
setting that differed from prior research in two aspects: (1) they used data from
the. post-SOX era; and (2) they examined abnormal returns following auditor
switches after a GCO. Their results indicated that when companies switch audit
firms, the GCO results in positive abnom1al retums. Investors might, undcr
sóri1e circumstances, perceive the auditor as an insurer rather than as an entity
providing new information to the market. Investigatíng this possibility,
O'Reilly et al. [2006] found that the extent to which stakeholders perceive
auditors as an insurer reduces the negative impact of a GCO. Another moderator of thc informativeness of GCOs is investor type [Willenborg and McKeown, 2000]. Willenborg and McKeown [2000] found that organizations that
receive GCOs when going public were more likely to be delisted within two
ycars of going public, and suggested that GCOs help reduce uncertainty for
uninformed investors.
The negative reaction concerning the GCO company itself can ha ve anegative contagian effeet that adversely affects share prices of other companies
within the same industry [Schaub, 2006b]. Other research indicates that reac,
tions to GCOs might be understated, as investors in both the U.K. [TafHer et
al., 2004] and the U.S. [Kausar et al., 2009] underreacted to GCOs in the medium-term (one-year). However, Schaub [2006a] contended that investors overreact rather than underreact to GCOs based on his findirig that nearly 70 percent of the average Jos ses on the announcement date were recovered within five
days ofthe GCO.
Other research suggests that in sorne settings, a GCO can have positive
consequences for the client and its .stakeholders. Chen and Church [1996]
found that GCOs can lessen the negative stock price reactíon of a bankruptcy
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filing across rhree- , five-, and seven-day windows surrounding the filing. Additionally, Morris and Stawser [1999] found that ba nk regulators were_ more
likely to allow banks to conti nue operating if the bank received a GCO from a
Big N audit firm.
.
Another possibility is that markets do not react ro GCOs. StudJes supporting this view have fouod that the Australian market [0g11eva and Subramanyam, 2007; Bessell et al., 2003] and the Spanish market [Pucheta-Martinez
et al., 2004] did nol reacl to GCOs, and that the observed a bnormal retw·ns
fo!Jowing GCOs in the U.S. were sensitive to the choice of expected retum
[Ogneva and Subramanyam,. 2007].
Herbohn et al. [2007] found that medium-terrn underreactions to first-time
GCOs do not persist over time. Kwon and Wild [1994] used a sample of companies that received first-time GCOs during the first tlu·ee years of SAS No. 59,
which changed standards conceming the issuance of GCOs. To investigate
infonnational value, ilie authors exarnined whether abnormal stock price reactions occur during the years preceding the first-time GCO. Kwon and Wild
[1994] found that first-time GCOs are informative, as tl1e first-time GCO companies experieuced abno¡mal equity reactions during each of the two years
preceding the GCO relative to the third and fourtl1 years prior to the first-ti me
GCO.
Blay and Geiger [200 1] examined the infonnational value of first-li me
GCOs, as well as whether abnormal ren1rns differ depending on whether tbe
client eventually underwent bankruptcy proceedings. They found no overall
association between abnormal returns and first-tirne GCOs, but iliat abnormal
remrns for con)panies that eventually go bankrupt were higher than for companies that did not eventual! y go bankrupt. Blay et aL [20 10] al so investigated
first-time GCOs, and found that these opinions result in a shift in the manner in
which market parúcipanL'> value the client compa ny, and found that following a
first-time GCO, market participants shift their valuation focus from both balance s beet and incorne statement iterns to only balance sheet items.
Gassen and Ska ife [2009] investigated market reactions to firsl-time GCOs
following the German audit reform of 1998, which required ·a uditors to repmt
going concern uncertainties. They found that GCOs issucd befare the reform
clid not affect the German market, but first-time GCOs issued after fue reform
were assocíated with negative abnormal returns. Conceming the effects of
changes in U.S. auditíng stanclards, H older-Webb and Wilki ns (2000] comparecl the relative information content of GCOs issued under SAS No. 34 and
SAS No. 59. Holder-Webb and WHkins [2000] found that ban krnp tcy surprises
associated with SAS No. 59 G COs were signjficantly smaller than bankruptcy
s urprises associated with both· SAS No. 59 clean opinions and SAS No. 34
GCOs, and that the difference between the GCO bunkruptcy surprise and the
clean opinion bankruptcy surprise under SAS No. 59 was greater than the corresponding difference under SAS No. 34.
The somewhat inconsistent results 'of these studies provjde severa! fruitf'ul
opportunities for future research. Can conference calls, througb explanation of
the exception, mitigate any negative market reactions to GCOs? Additionally,
researchers could examine whether the mm·ket climate since SOX has exacerbated any responses to ·GCOs. Do companies receiving GCOs post-SOX experience more negative repercussions than companies receiving GCOs pre-
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SOX ? Fulure research also should extend Aldhlzer Ill e t aJ. [2009] to ascertain
whether the positive effect of GCOs following an auditor switch is an effect
attributable lo the post-SOX era, settings following anditor changes, or both.

4.2.2 Client Creditors
Creditors are sensitive to the prospect of loan defaults, and are accordingly
sens1tive to the possibility that their clients will declare bankruptcy. Researcb
p ublished at the time of Asare's review indicated that going concern uncertainty disclosures generally increased client creditors' risk assessmcms. Wilkins [1997] cxamined the association between GCO s and credit reactions , spcciíically cred itors' decisions of whether to waive initial debt covenant. violat\ons. Wilkins [19971 fo und that creditors are less likely to wave initial debt
covenant violations if the auditor issues a GCO. More recen tly, Elias and
Jollnston [200 1] in vestigatecl whether auclit reports w ith a going concern expianatory paragraph provide incremental infonn alion beyoncl the required footnote disclosure by havi ng 285 cornmercial loan officers complete an experimental task. Elias and Johnston [2001] fou nd that a going concern explanatory
paragraph hacl no incremental information content and did not influence loan
ofiicers ' assessments of bankruptcy likelihood .

4.3' Consequences of GCOs to Audit Firms
4.J.l Auditor Ratification and Switching
_ Auditors also run the risk of incLnTing damages when issuing a GCO. In
particular, one of the most salie nt reparations auditors face ís that of not being
ü ttified for the subsequent audit (if they so desired to remain the auditor).
S ainty et a l. [2002] invesLigated shareholder dissatisfactio n with the auditor
following GCOs, and found that GCOs, especially unexpected GCOs, were
positively associated with shareho lder dissatisfaction. The majority of research
w e include in this section, however, focuses o n actual auditor switching foJlowing modified opinions, despite Haskins and Williams [1990] earlier findings
that the audit op1nion was one of the Jeast imporlan t factors for sw itching aud1tors.7
Matsumura et al. [ 1997] proposed a theory relating to GCOs and audit
switching. T heir model ·indicated that cl i~nts are less likely to switch if they
believe the potential successor firm also would also issue a GCO, but that auditors are less likely to issue a GCO if they believe the client will switch. Empirical evidence does not explicitly address the theory provided by Matsurnura et
al. (1997]. However, T ucker and Matsumura [1998] found that increasi ng the
Jikelihood that successor audi tors will issue clean opinions does not increase
auditor pa1tícipants' issuance of clean opinions, and that client participants' are
more likely to switch as auditor reporting varies. Sinúlarly, Carcello and Palmrose [1994] found tbat GCOs are associated with higher auditor dismissal rates. '

1

Fur a re\'iew of thc litcrature un auditor s~itching, ple~se s~ Stefa niak e l al. [2009).
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Krish11an and Krishnan [ 1997] examined auditor resignations and dismissals surrounding GCOs and clients with high litigation risk. They found that
when liLigation risk is high, auditors that issue GCOs are more likely to resign
than be dismissed by the cl ient. Krishnan and Krishnan [1997] concluded Lhat
litigation risk can int1uence the market for audit services.
Other research indicates that switching folJowing a modified opiníon is not
simply based on the presence of tbe modification. Krishnan [1994] found that
companies receiving GCOs that were "undeserved; i.e., the result of a conservative treatment" [p. 207] were more likely to switch auditors than companies
receiving deserved ciean opinions. Similarly, Geiger et al. [1998] found that
undeserved, first-timc GCOs are associated with a higher likelihood that the
client wiJI dismiss the auditor, but switching auditors does not affect the likelihood of removing the GCO in the subsequent period. Hudaib and Cooke [2005]
found that the likelihood that a client will switch auclitors correlates positively
with the severity of the modification. Thus, the relationship betv.veen GCOs and
auditor switching appears more complex than simply the presence of a GCO.
Carcello anct Neal [2003] found that companies were more likely to switch
auditors following f.irst-time GCOs if the committee had greater proportions of
affiliated directors, if committee members owned higher levels of stock, and if
committce members held fewer director positions on other boards. Accordingly, audit committee independence appears to be an important factor related
to switching following GCOs.
Research from other jurisdictions also contributes to our understanding of
thc relationship between GCOs and auditor switching. Evidence fi·om the U.K.
[Citron and Taffler, 1992] and Australia [Carey et al., 2008] also suggests that
clients receiving GCOs are more likely to switch auditors than clients that receive clean opinions. In Belgium, regulations require companies to engage their
auditors for renewable three-year periods, Vanstraeleu [2003] found that clients
were four times more Iikely to switch auditors at the end of the mandatory retention term if they reccived GCOs in the final yea.r of the term than if they
received GCOs in the previous two years. Concerning mandatory audit firm
rotation, evidence from Spain suggests that this ·r equirement increases Spanish
auditan;' propensity to issue GCOs [Ruiz-Ba.rbadillo et al., 2009].
4.3.2 Litigation

Iu addition to auditor ratification and switching, the auditor must all contend with the possibility of litigation resulting from their association with a
going concern entity. Blacconiere and DeFond [1997] examined auditor propensity to issue GCOs for the last tinancial statement released by public savings and loan companies that declared bankruptcy..They found that whiJe auditors typically issue GCOs (19 of 24 cases), those tbat did usually faced lawsuits
(tbe auditor issued a GCO in five o( ·:;even cases that were litigated). BlaccoJ;Liere and DeFond [1997], accordingly, suggested that GCOs in the year prior
to che failure of a savings and Imm do not prevent auditor litigation.
Carcello and Palmrose [1994] investigated whether GCOs issued prior to
bank:ruptcy protect auditors from litigation. Carcello and Palmrose [I994]
found that companies that received GCOs were less likely to be litigated by

20 10

Gisse/, Robert.wm, Stefalliak

l 31

shareholders, that dismissal rates wcre highest when the auditor issues a GCO,
and that GCOs weaken plaintiff' s claims against auditors. Similar!y, Mong and
Roebuck [20051 found that issuing a GCO reduces litigation. We believe opportunities for research concerning auditor litigation are especially relevant in
the current environment given recent bank tailures. Prior rcsearch suggests that
auditors could face litigation when financiúl institutions collapse [e.g., Blacconicrc and DeFond, 1997; Hill and Metzger, 1992]. Accordingly, future research could investigate litigation against auditors involving clean opinions
issued to U.S. financial institutions that received governrnent bailouts in 20082009. For instance, does empirical evidence support the concerns of Sikka
[20091, who notes ti1at auditors frequently failed to issue GCOs for the audits
immediately preceding rhe high-profile bank failures of 2008? Are lawsuits
rmore or less likely folimving ba ilouts? A lso, has litigation exposure increased
for auditors who fail to issue a going concem for a company that subsequently
v-Jynt bankrupt?

5.0 CONCLUSIONS
Asare provided a review of acadenúc research on GCOs as well as a summary of standards impacting GCOs. Over the past two decades, researchers
have conlinued to investigare issues conceming the formation and conseqt1ences of GCOs. Additionally, new standarcls and regulations ha ve emerged
th~1t impact the formation of GCOs . In this paper, we sumrnarize current stand.:-irds and regulations on GCOs. We also review acaclernic literature published
since Asm-e's review that addresses the formation and consequences of GCOs.
In addition to t11e specitic conclusions and research questions discussed in
our review, we believe two issues meril additional consideration. First, auditors
face a s ignificant contlict between profitability incentives and litigation risk
concerns during the process o [ deciding whether to íssue a GCO. Tbe literature
we reviewed indicates t11at auditor decis ion making in sorne cases is more reflective of profitability incentives, but in other cases is more retlecti ve of litígation risk concerns. Therefore, our understanding of the impact of these conflicting incentives on GCO formation is s till developing. We propase several research suggestions in our section on this tradeoff (3.3.1.2) that can continue to
improve our understanding of these issues.
Second, GCOs, including first-time GCOs, matter to client stockholders in
tbat GCOs oftcn are associated with abnonnal equity reactions. We identified
few s tudies that investigate the conseqw:!nces GCOs carry to other client stakeholders such as creclitors. The majority of the literature on consequences of
GCOs to client stakeholders focuses on equity reac tions, though Ogneva and
Subramanyam [2007] explicitly called for more research on reactions from
bonclholders and analysts to GCOs. Accordingly, we reiterate Asare' s [1990, p.
56] s uggestion that future researcb "should explore the impact of going concem
report~g on suppliers of debt capital, the client' s investment/production decis ions,·regulatory agencies, and labor/management relations and contract negotiations." Our review indicates that tlús suggestion offered by Asare remains
unanswered, and we believe the need for such research sti11 exists.
Aithough many questions concemi.ng GCOs have been answered by the
s tudies we reviewed, other questioris remain. Accordingly, as part of our re-
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view, we offer suggesrions for fut ure rescarch in many of our subsections, and
present these research questio ns in Table 4 for convenjent re ference.
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TABLE 4: A Summary of Future Research Opportunities
Panel A: Future Rcseru:c h Opportuniries Presented in Scction 2.0- The
Responsibility for Re porting Going concern Uncertainties

2.2 The E[fecrs of Standards ami Regu./a1ions 011 GCO Formarion tmd Issuam:e
2.2.1 The Effecls ofSAS Nos. 58 and 59 on GCO Formarion and lssunnce
Are the long-term effects of SAS Nos. 58 and 59 on au dit quality are similar to the
short-term consequences observed in prior research?
2.2.2 The E.tfects o{Laws and Regulations 011 GCO Formation l//1{/ ls.mance
The PCAOB has issued a concept release that would potentially require partners lo
sign d1e audit opinion [PCAOB 2009]. Would a partner be more conscrvative in GCO
judgme nls if he/sbe is required to personally sign the uudir opinion?
r What are the implications of the U.S. government' s response to the recent financia.!
.. :· reces::.ion on the issuance of GCOs? For instance, how do bailouts intluence going
concern judgments and decisions?
Panel B: Future Research Opportunities Presented in Section 3.0- Auditors'
Identification und Formation of GCOs

3.1 Characteristics o.f Clients Receil'in~ GCOs
- · Are the differences in prior research concerning the relationsh ip between client size
and GCOs due to differences in contro l variables, or differences in U1c regulations or
-.- risks to tbe auditor in the U .K. vers us Lhe U .S.?
Does thc prcsence of a financia ! expert, as required by SOX [U.S.H .R., 2002], influence audltors' propensity lo issue GCOs? Other corporate governance factors that
could influence GCO formation are frequency of audil committee meetings, the num. ber of boards on which each audit committee member serves, and length of service of
audit comrnittee me mbers.

3.1.1 Client Eam.ings Managemellt
An experime ntal study that manipulates the reason for abnonnal accruals cou!d help
reconcile inconsistent results from prior literature concerning the relationship between
abnorma1 accruals and auditors' propensity to issue GCOs.
Sin ce But.ler et al. [2004] and Fmncis and Krishnan [ 1999 J used pre-SOX d ata , fu tu re
research cou ld invesligate whether changes in conservatism fo ll owing SOX impact the
relut.ionship between the mag nitude of accruals and auditors' propensity to issue
GCOs.
Explore the relationship between GCOs and add itional eamings management maltcrs
could be investigated (e.g., real earnings management, meeting eamings cx.pectations,
using special income statement items).

3. 1.2 Cliem Press Co verage
Followi ng Joe [2003], what are the effects of negati ve publicity from media such as
television and Internet sources on auditors' GCO judgments and decisions?
If the media report positive infonnalion about d istressed clients, are auditors less
likcly lo issue GCOs, perhaps incrcasing the risk of Type II errors?

3.2 GCOs and Forecastíng Bankruptcies

·.~-
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3.2.1 Forecas/ing Models
Whíle the Lenard et al. (2000] hybrid model and t.he Lenard et al. [1995] ncural network are accurate predictors of GCOs, are they practica! decision aids? Lenard et nl.
[1995] do note that their model should be tested by auditors. Do auditors possess sufficient technícal expertise to use these models? If not, whut degree of lrai ni ng is required, and would the model pass cost-benefit considerations?
To what extenr do audit fi rms actually rely on bankruprcy prediction models in practice, and would a GCO flag triggered by a bankruptcy prediction model be sufficient
evidence for an auditor issue a GCO?
lf auditors are not willing to use such models, what factors drive those decisions?
3.2.2 The Self-Fuljilling Prophecy
Given conflicting results of prior research, does a self-fulfilling prophecy exist?
3.3 Auditor Characteristics
3.3.1 Auditor Economic Incentives
33.1.1 Audít Fees, Non-Arrdit Fees, (111(/ Auditor lndependence
Future research should examine purely post-SOX periods to determine if early resulls
conceming GCOs and non-audit services still hold in the post-SOX_Qeriod.
Following Lai [2009], would allowing expanded non-audit services, but requiring
auditors to disclose all fees, improve independence?
What other potential sources of increased independence in the formation of the GCO
exist? For ex.ample, would an cngagement review pnrmer reach a similar opinion of an
entity's abilityto continue as agoing concern as the engagement partner?
3.3.1.2 Trade-aff.\' Berween Profitability and Litigation
Future research should invesligate whether the regulatory changes of t11e fi rsl decade
of the 21 ' 1 century ha ve impacted the trade-off between profitability incentives and
litigation risks, as lhe majority of U.S. research relies on data thatpredales SOX
J1I\5w•,t'J\1lfLÜI::t&'élll' lünnreúu' ér'i~:s á'n<:l' en~üÜfg govl!i'hmeift' thüouts iiü1bencect' GCO'
formation? For instance, if lhe auditor is aware a company wi ll receive federal assistance (e.g., TARP funds), does the auditor consider that infonnation when determining
whether a GCO is appropriate?
Replicate Blay [2005] with a more salient profitability incentive maúipulation, perhaps
by explicitly mentioning the amount of revenue the accounling firm would lose if the
client switched audit firms.
lf auctitors provided a probability of GCO rather thun un opinion expressing doubt
about lhe client's ability to continue to operate, would htigation risk increase,, decrease, or not change?
-3.3.2 Auditor Cognitive Processe~· and GCOs
Replicate Ashton and Kennedy [2002) using partners and managers rather than staff
auditor particípants to determine if thc observed receney effect is robust to experience.
Does the timing of the decision aid intluence it."> effectiveness concerning GCO judgments? Would similar results occur if the auditor receives tbe prompt befare evaluating any evidence?
Do auditors in some situations, perhaps· in response to econonuc incentives, auend
more to _Q_osi tive information items to avoid alienating the client?
Is it possible that arder effects interact on sorne level with other engagement risk factors (e.g., litigalion risk, reputation risk, etc.) to influence auditor GCO formalion?
~
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3.3.3 Auditor Expertise
SOX requires audit partner rotation every five years, which provides :m opportunity tor
future research lo examine whether partner-specific tenure int1uenccs GCO issunnce.
In addition, future research could examine the GCO formation in a group setting
(similar to recen! research on fraud risk brainstorming), or how engagement partners
and additional technical advisors help fonn tbe GCO opinion.
Panel C: Fuwre Research Opporrunities Presen.ted ill
Section 4.0- Consequeuces of GCOs
4.2 Clienr Stakeholder Reactions to GCOs
4.2.1 Cliem Stockholders
Can conference calls, through explanation of the exception, mitigate any negative
1n1arket reactions to GCOs?
.·Has the market climate since SOX has exacerbated any responses lO GCOs?
Exteud Aldhizer III et al. [2009] lo ascertain whether the positive effect of GCOs following an auditor switch is :m effect attributable to the post-SOX eru, seltings following auditor changes, or bolh.
4.3 Consequences ofGCOs to Artdit Firms
4.3.2 Liti ~ation
. -,Does empirical evidence support the concerns of Sikka [2009], who notes that auditors
!frec¡uently failed to issue GCOs fo r the audits irnmediately preceding the high-profile
ibank failures of 2008? Are Jawsnits more or less likely following bailouts?
Has litigation exposure increased for audilors who fail lo issue a going concern for a
company that subsequentl y went bankrupt?
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